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Abstract 
Informed by the neo-institutional perspective, this study seeks for the first time to investigate 
empirically the determinants of ISA adoption and commitment to harmonisation on a cross-
national basis (89 countries). The findings show that the protection of minority interests, 
regulatory enforcement, lenders/borrowers rights, foreign aid, prevalence of foreign 
ownership, educational attainment and particular forms of political system (level of 
democracy) prevailing in a country, are observed to be significant predictors of the extent of 
commitment to the adoption and harmonisation of ISAs. Our statistical analysis therefore 
suggests that coercive, mimetic and normative pressure have a significant impact on ISA 
adoption relative to economic (efficiency-led) factors. Our findings imply that current efforts 
by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and other international agencies to 
implement ISAs need to recognise that a broad set of institutional factors, rather than narrow 
economic ones, are of relevance in the development of audit policymaking, practice and 
regulation worldwide.  
 
Key words: International Standards on Auditing; Neo-institutional Theory; Accounting 
 
 
Introduction 
It is often claimed that the international harmonisation of accounting and auditing 
standards can be beneficial to the development of an effective and efficient global economy 
through the provision of relevant and credible accounting information to users and markets 
(Radebaugh & Gray, 1997; Needles et al., 2002, Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006; Murphy et al., 
2008; Archambault & Archambault, 2009; Leuz, 2010), culminating in significant attempts 
to bring convergence over the last decade (IASB, 2014). Yet, several studies have 
documented that there remains different levels of IFRS adoption and diffusion worldwide 
(Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006; Leuz, 2010) arising from the different ways in which accounting 
developments interact with specific national economic, social, legal, cultural and political 
systems to generate particular accounting outcomes and/or practices. In this respect, both 
Zeghal & Mhedhbi (2006) and Leuz (2010) express doubts on the accounting convergence 
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process, whether in developed or developing economies. Contrastingly, there has been little 
research on the adoption and/or degree of commitment to auditing standards, and specifically 
the case of international standards on auditing (ISAs) (Needles et al., 2002; Ye & Simunic, 
2013; Simunic et al., 2013), in spite of the fact that ISAs are considered to be one of the key 
standards for sound financial systems by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) alongside IFRS. 
According to Simunic et al., (2013): 
“Audits are performed to improve the validity and reliability of information produced in 
compliance with a set of accounting standards, and auditing standards provide a measure 
of audit quality and articulate the objectives to be achieved in an audit” (2013, p. 5). 
Auditing standards seek, for example, to codify aspects such as audit planning, audit 
engagement procedures, the collection and analysis of audit evidence, the review of internal 
control systems and the content of audit reports (Mennicken, 2008). Whilst the auditor still 
has flexibility in terms of how he/she executes the audit assignment (e.g. how much evidence 
is deemed to be sufficient), adherence to ISAs (or any other generally accepted auditing 
standards) confers credibility to the audit exercise and enables a third party (e.g. audit 
regulator; peer audit reviewer; parties in a litigation process) to infer upon an auditor’s 
approach, completeness and consistency in carrying out an audit assignment. Furthermore, an 
audit firm claiming to offer a service in line with international standards can expect 
reputational and financial benefits in terms of high profile clients and premium fees.  
Relatedly, Leuz (2010) argues that auditing is a part of the enforcement mechanism 
that ensures the accounting and reporting of information is appropriate to the needs of users 
and which moderates managerial discretion in the production of the financial statements. 
However, the potency of such enforcement depends partly on the way the standard is used by 
the auditor and the importance it has been assigned to in a particular jurisdictional context. In 
this respect, according to the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 126 countries 
have so far adopted ISAs using different bases (wholesale adoption by law, wholesale 
adoption by standard setter or partial adoption to meet country needs), which can be 
associated to the extent to which a country is committed to ISAs. A wholesale adoption of 
ISAs on a legal basis can be seen to be  a clearer and stronger signal to an international and 
national ‘audience’ (including audit firms) as to the country’s priority to the development of a 
‘weak or strong form of harmonisation’ 1  of audit practice. Other forms of adoption 
admittedly communicate as well a commitment, inclusive of countries that have so far only 
                                                            
1
 A similar argument is put forward by Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015) whereby the authors assess IFRS 
adoption per country on the basis of a scale from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ form (1-7) of harmonisation    
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stated an intention ‘on paper’ to adopt ISAs, but our contention is that the different 
classifications of adoption represent varying forms of ‘obligation’ or engagement to ISAs. 
Relatedly, Simunic et al. (2013) contend that traditionally, how national auditing standards 
were developed and enforced tended to reflect a country’s business environment and legal 
systems but recently, the authors assert that more countries have tended to adopt a more 
uniform set of standards, and in particular, it is predicted that ISAs will be adopted (with or 
without modifications) by countries with similar legal characteristics. However, to date, there 
has been no empirical validation of such predictions, and more importantly in our view, 
Simunic et al. (2003) does not consider the relevance other non-legal national characteristics 
that might lead to different forms of commitment to ISA adoption. The above discussion thus 
raises two related questions: 
First, what are the factors that have influenced national ISA adoption and second, to 
what extent do these factors explain the different levels of commitment or engagement with 
ISA as defined by IFAC?   
The motivations for this study are twofold. First, an understanding of the extent of 
commitment to ISA adoption cross-nationally and the determinants of such engagement can 
enlighten one’s understanding of the national factors influencing the spread (or not) of global 
auditing standards. Recent work by Humphrey et al., (2009), Humphrey & Loft (2013) and 
Simunic et al., (2013) have revealed how ISAs have gained prominence within the 
international financial architecture (2009, p. 811), which is controlled by the ISA issuer 
(International Federation of Accountants; IFAC), international financial regulators (such as 
IOSCOi) and large audit firms., Anecdotally, the World Bank’s Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) indicate that (1) many countries’ auditing standards are not in 
line with ISAs, (2) even amongst those countries that have implemented ISAs, full 
compliance has not occurred mainly due to the lack of qualified professionals, adequate 
education and training, and enforcement (see also Kohler, 2009). Whilst a few country-level 
case studies (e.g. Brody et al., 2005; Dellaportas et al., 2008; Mennicken, 2008; Al-Awaqleh, 
2010) have provided some insights for specific countries (e.g. US, Canada and China) and 
work by Humphrey et al. (2009) and Humphrey & Loft (2013) have highlighted the 
positioning of ISAs and IFAC at the global level, there is correspondingly little empirical 
work that has considered the extent of harmonisation of ISAs cross-nationally (notable 
exception being Schockaert & Houyoux, 2007, focusing on the EU). Second, our study seeks 
to complement the extant audit literature which has typically paid more attention to micro-
level issues of audit independence, audit fees, audit committees and audit opinions (e.g. 
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Bedard & Gendron, 2010; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013). By providing evidence of the 
varying spread of, and commitment, to ISAs at a country level and the reasons thereof, we 
argue that such factors have a bearing on country or case studies which for instance examine 
the operation and effectiveness of ISA methodologies; at the level of audit firms and/or audit 
assignments.  
Consequently, we develop an explanatory model which, in line with neo-institutional 
perspective, postulates that ISA adoption, in terms of the reported level of commitment to 
global harmonisation of auditing standards is associated to a number of social, cultural, 
political pressures which could be conceptualised as coercive, mimetic and normative forces, 
in addition to the typical economic (efficiency-led) pressures associated with greater calls for 
the harmonisation of auditing standards worldwide (e.g. stock market and economic 
development). Variables reflecting these institutional and efficiency-led pressures were 
considered and selected initially in line with prior studies (Needles et al., 2002; Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi, 2006; Judge et al., 2010). However, given the possibility that a single proxy can 
hardly be expected to reflect all facets of coercive, mimetic and normative pressures 
respectively (as set out in Judge et al.’s (2010) work) and in light of the differences in the 
dynamics between commitment to ISA and IFRS adoption, we consider supplementary 
country-level data mainly from the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World Economic 
Forum, Economic Intelligence Unit and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
The archival data that is available for 89 countries over a four year period (2009-2012) forms 
the basis of the empirical analysis. Briefly, the paper’s findings suggest that specific coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures are associated to the extent of ISA adoption. Furthermore, 
different analytical approaches were used and a separate model was tested using the adoption 
of “Clarified ISAsii” to test the sensitivity of the results, and mindful of the argument that the 
dependent variable could be also seen as a categorical variableiii. Fixed effect models (year 
fixed effects and country fixed effects) were also used to minimise both the effects of (i) 
omitted variable bias and (ii) endogeneity.  
This study provides a pertinent empirical explanation of the institutional factors 
associated to the extent of the national commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. The 
findings are of relevance to policy-makers and advisers who are tasked with improving the 
quality of financial reporting worldwide and ensuring ’financial stability’, the latter being an 
increasingly prominent agenda in the wake of several financial crises (Humphrey et al., 2009). 
Of note is the fact that IOSCO did not provide a clear endorsement of the ‘clarified’ ISAs in 
2009iv. As reported by Humphrey & Loft (2013), IOSCO merely ‘encouraged’ its members to 
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accept audits performed and reported in accordance with ISAs whilst recognising that “….the 
decision whether to do so will depend on a number of factors and circumstances in their 
jurisdiction” (cited in Humphrey & Loft, 2013, p. 335). Our study therefore sheds light on 
the nature of these factors and circumstances and why would particular countries signal 
different levels of commitment to ISAs. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
A brief analysis of the state of ISAs worldwide is first presented followed by an explanation 
of the theoretical framework and the formulation of hypotheses. The data and methods are 
outlined followed by the findings, analysis and conclusions.  
 
Overview of International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) 
The increased initial attention to the state and development of ISAs has been often 
attributed to concerns about the quality of financial statements and auditing standards in the 
wake of the Asian economic crisis at the end of the 1990s and more recently, to the 
regulatory implications arising from the global financial crisis (Needles et al., 2002; 
Humphrey et al., 2009; Mennicken, 2008; Simunic et al., 2013). For instance, various 
international bodies (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) criticized large accounting 
firms for their apparent and uncritical acceptance of local GAAP when preparing financial 
statements, and highlighted the need for greater coordination between international and 
national auditing standards (Needles et al., 2002). In effect, a greater alignment between 
accounting and auditing developments was recommended to ensure that the international 
harmonisation agenda could deliver tangible outcomes for users, preparers and auditors 
(Radebaugh & Gray, 1997). However, the paucity of studies on the implementation and 
harmonisation of auditing standards (e.g. Needles et al. 2002; Mennicken, 2008) relative to 
the large number of studies on accounting standards clearly reflected the priorities of 
academics, practitioners and policy makers.  
Although auditing standards tend to be generally more prescriptive, process-oriented 
and involve a lower number of players (typically accounting firms, standard setters and 
international / national financial market regulators), Needles et al., (2002) observe that the 
process of international auditing harmonization has not been very successful (see also Kohler, 
2009 in the case of the EU). The authors contend that the lag in the development and 
adoption of ISAs could be explained by (i) the need to resolve accounting issues (e.g. 
measurement) first before considering how to assess the implementation of these accounting 
issues by companies, (ii) the need to initially legislate on accounting and auditing matters to 
provide the necessary legal backing for external audits and financial statements, but a lag 
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may be due to the inherent slowness of legislative processes, (iii) the influence of large 
accounting firms which have historically seen themselves as operating in a self-regulatory 
environment and hence not keen to embrace externally defined standards of practicev , (iv) 
the resistance by local regulators to ISAs since the use of local auditing standards allowed 
them to have some control over the audit process, and (v) the low level of professional 
education and training in accounting which may impact on the quality of the auditing 
function in some countries. Needles et al., (2002) argue the above factors can be empirically 
tested but does not rely on a theoretical framework to justify the selection and relative 
importance of these factors. A common thread from Needles et al.’s, (2002) discussion 
suggests that the extent of commitment to ISAs may be dependent on how the accounting 
profession and accounting standards first ‘bed in’ in the relevant jurisdiction and secondly on 
how regulators will (if at all) handle enforcement and compliance.    
Contemporary evidence on the extent of ISA implementation and the implications 
thereof has been gradually emerging over the last decade. The initial findings originate from 
the World Bank Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs 2003 to 2010) 
which provide narratives on the status and operation of auditing standards (www. 
worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html.). In particular, the reports reveal that in many countries, 
local auditing standards have not been harmonised in line with ISAs. In some other countries 
ISAs are required by law signalling greater commitment but yet evidence shows that auditing 
processes do not fully comply with the standards. Table 1 summarises the findings from a 
number of countriesvi. These issues have also been seen relevant to the EU bloc (Kohler, 
2009) and have been acknowledged as part of attempts to improve the global ‘financial 
architecture’ in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis (Ojo, 2010; Humphrey et al., 2009). 
Fraser (2010) is, however, particularly critical of the absence of a coherent approach to ISA 
adoption within the EU. At one level, there appears to be no major ‘public’ opposition to the 
need for the global harmonisation of auditing standards, but yet the extent of commitment at 
the national level remains problematic and is highlighted in the various country Statements of 
Membership Obligations (SMO) reports filed with IFAC (elaborated in subsequent sections). 
The continued variation in the extent of commitment to ISA harmonisation thus reveals the 
different outcomes and decisions reached by national policy makers on the suitability of ISAs 
for their jurisdictions.     
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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In this stream of research, there have been very few in-depth investigations of the ‘practice’ 
of ISAs at the national level. Mennicken (2008) provides an extensive case study of how a 
leading Russian audit firm sought to adopt international auditing standards. In this respect, 
the author highlights the strong effect of the historical, social and political context of Russia, 
particularly in terms of accounting practice being primarily focused on tax rules and 
complying with government decrees. Mennicken’s (2008) work underlines the point that a 
commitment to ISA adoption is expected to differ depending on the country’s political, 
economic and social context.  
 
Simunic et al. (2013) work seek to model the impact of ISA adoption on audit quality given a 
country’s legal liability regime and concludes that there cannot be an optimal level for the 
adoption of ISAs worldwide unless there is also uniformity in the legal regimes of these 
countries. Hence, for countries where local legislation is weak and poorly enforced, 
compliance with ISAs could be well lead to a fall in audit quality. Whilst we do agree with 
Simunic et al.’s (2013) arguments, we contend that the cost-benefit analysis subsumed within 
this legal perspective a rather narrow interpretation of the relevance of social and political 
issues. In other words, the legal implications identified by Simunic et al., (2013) only 
emphasise the financial and economic consequence and do not explicitly consider that the 
effects of a legal regime may need to be analysed in the presence of other social and political 
factors pertaining to the jurisdiction. In contrast, other country studies (e.g. Al-Awaqleh, 
2010; Brody et al., 2005) provide an account of some of the national difficulties in adopting 
ISAs but provide limited theoretically-informed analysis of the factors leading to the extent 
of adoption to, and harmonisation with, ISAs.  
In conclusion to this section, there is a scant body of work on the dissemination of 
ISAs worldwide and why countries adopt ISAs at a particular level of ‘commitment’ (e.g. 
adoption by law, adoption using standard-setters, modified adoption).Whilst underlining the 
spread of ISA adoption worldwide, most authors - whether from an academic, professional or 
policy-making perspective - qualify their assessments of ‘adoption’ by referring to the 
moderating effects of institutional factors, and except for the notable case of Mennicken 
(2008), previous ISA studies have not been informed by an explicit theoretical framework. In 
this regard, our argument is that the level of commitment to, and adoption of, any 
professional standards of practice, either developed at national or international level, is 
influenced by the institutional environment (Nobes, 1998; Collier, 2002; Guler et al., 2002; 
Touron, 2005; Judge et al., 2010; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazzura, 2009; Leuz, 2010). Political, 
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economic, cultural and social factors influence organisations and actors within a national 
setting country and these institutional pressures may construe why one country may either 
imitate (or not) other countries (as e.g. trading partner or related via colonial heritage, 
religious (and/or ethnic) affiliation, geographical proximity, and/or similar political 
systems/ideologies). Admittedly, efficiency motives (i.e. adoption of the standards on the 
grounds of functional and economic outcomes) can also explain a commitment to adopt 
(Simunic et al., 2013) but neo-institutional explanations have generally been found to be also 
relevant in similar cross-country studies of adoption or commitment to international practices 
such as corporate governance codes and IFRS (e.g. Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
More generally, the accounting literature has developed a body of evidence whereby 
motivations for accounting change, harmonisation and developments in accounting practice 
have been associated to diverse country-level factors (e.g. Ben Othman and Kossentini, 2015). 
In light of the nature of the practice (ISAs), a neo-institutional perspective provides the 
underpinning for our hypotheses.  
 
 
Theory and hypothesis development 
The neo-institutional perspective is based on the premise that organisations respond to 
pressures from their institutional environments and adopt structures and/or procedures that 
are socially accepted as being the appropriate organisational choice (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 in Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). Tuttle & Dillard (2007) and Judge 
et al. (2010) have relied on this framework in financial accounting research and other IFRS-
related studies, whilst not explicitly adopting a neo-institutional framework, have explored 
the empirical relevance of a range of institutional-led factors (e.g. Zaghal & Mhedbhi, 2006; 
Archambault & Archambault, 2009; Gordon et al., 2012) .  
Using a hierarchy of institutional influence, Scott (2001) explains three different 
levels of institutional pressures. First the higher level environment affects the lower level 
institutions. He argues that higher level institutions (e.g. societal and global) formally 
propose models and standards which form and restrain actions at lower levels. At the second 
level there are the organisational governance structures which comprise of organisational 
field and the organisations themselves. An organisation field comprises of organisations in 
the same area of services such as the audit profession together with other organisations and 
constituencies which influence their performance such as accountants, bankers, insurers, 
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regulators and the public. Scott (1987) further argues that organisations conform to 
institutional pressures for change due to the fact that they are rewarded for doing so through 
increased legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities. Organisations may react differently 
because they vary by size, culture, structures and management style. All these influence and 
are influenced by their organisational field and institutional environments. At the lower level 
are the individuals or groups who are influenced by the first two levels. Carpenter & Feroz 
(2001) suggest that a State’s decision to commit or adopt generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) can be influenced at individual, organisational and organisational field 
level. At the individual level, the pressures are through key decision-makers’ norms, values 
and unconscious conformity to traditions, at organisational level by shared belief systems, 
power and politics and at organisational field level through regulatory pressures, public 
pressures and the accounting profession’s norms and values. In a similar vein therefore, a 
country’s decision to engage with ISAs at different levels of commitment (or harmonisation) 
can also be influenced at individual, organisational and organisational field level.  
The forces and/ or pressures within the three levels of analysis proposed by Scott 
(2001) align with DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) explanation of the homogenisation process of 
organisation. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) describe this process as isomorphism i.e. a process 
which causes one unit from a population to look like other units in the same population 
operating in similar environmental condition. They identify two categories of isomorphism, 
namely: competitive and institutional and further sub-divide institutional isomorphism into 
three types: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. This paper focuses on the three 
types of isomorphism. Similarly, Judge et al., (2010) adopt the three types of isomorphism in 
a cross-national study seeking to explain national IFRS adoption in 132 countries. They argue 
that the extent of IFRS adoption (as defined by Deloitte, 2008) is the result of coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures (explained further below). They identify one variable for 
each type of institutional pressure, respectively foreign aid, important penetration and 
educational level, and find all three variables to be significant in the presence of two control 
variables (market capitalisation and GDP growth). The authors also find that the traditional 
cultural variables (Hofstede, 1984) and securities law (La Porta et al., 2006) are not 
significant in explaining the extent to which a country will adopt IFRS.  
Coercive isomorphism stems from resource dependence and legitimacy concerns 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The authors argue that this type of isomorphism can originate 
from the highest level institutions, which can influence the structures and actions of social 
and economic actors. An example of a powerful institution is the State (Scott, 1995) because 
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organisations within a country are influenced by rules and regulations institutionalised and 
legitimised by the State (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organisations can also be required to 
commit to different levels of ISA harmonisation due to legislation, rules, and regulations set 
up by the stock market regulators, competition or sector-based bodies (e.g. central banks), 
and other regulatory agencies, such as accounting and audit standard setting institutions. 
However, the ‘potency’ of these coercive mechanisms may differ in different institutional 
contexts by virtue of the extent to which a threat to legitimacy would ensue and the penalties 
faced by organisations for not signalling a sufficient level of adoption or commitment to 
harmonisation. At the same time, certain forms of legal systems can hamper the incorporation 
of international standards in local regulations. For instance, both Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2004) and Zattoni & Cuomo (2008) examine elements of the legal system (common law vs. 
civil law, extent of shareholder protection rights) on the country’s decision to issue corporate 
governance (CG) codes. In contexts characterised by a common-law system and a lack of 
shareholder protection rights, it is observed that CG codes were issued faster compared to 
other countries exhibiting a civil-law system and stronger shareholder rights. Whilst 
corporate governance codes might be conceived as a substitutive mechanism to counter-
balance generally weak or ineffective shareholder protection legislation, it may be argued that 
the adoption of ISA standards is a rather complementary mechanism in ensuring the quality 
of financial statements. Overall, one might expect that extent of commitment to ISA adoption 
and harmonisation would be higher in national contexts where minority interests are more 
protected. Therefore, we hypothesise that 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the extent to which minority interests are 
protected and the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. . 
 
A key insight from the various studies commenting on the spread of ISAs (Needles et 
al., 2002; Humphrey et al., 2009; Humphrey & Loft, 2013; Simunic et al., 2013) relates to the 
issue of enforcement in national settings. ISAs may be developed and improved at the global 
level by international institutions (IOSCO, IFAC, global accounting firms) but in practice, 
how and to what extent accounting firms implement international auditing standards is left to 
local (or foreign) professional bodies and regulatory agencies. Whilst there has been recent 
attempts (e.g. refer to Humphrey et al., 2013) to assist national structures (typically involving 
an audit regulator, national professional associations and other State regulators), there are, 
however, generic issues relating to the power, authority, competence and resource attributed 
to enforcement agencies. As argued by Simunic et al., (2013), adopting a set of standards 
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without a proper legal enforcement system will not necessarily improve audit quality. 
Similarly, Kolk & Perego (2010) contend that the independent audit function “…facilitates 
contracting by reducing information asymmetry and monitoring the performance of the 
contracting parties” (2010, p. 186) but this is conditional upon a robust legal and 
enforcement infrastructure. We, therefore, argue that the extent of regulatory enforcement 
may influence the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation in a given 
jurisdiction. Hence we propose the following hypothesis,   
H2: There is a positive relationship between the extent of regulatory enforcement and 
the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. 
 
La Porta et al., (1998) contend that lenders rights are more complex than shareholder 
rights for two reasons. First there are creditors with overriding rights (senior secured creditors) 
on other creditors with lesser rights (junior creditors). Senior creditors have the right to 
repossess and then liquidate or keep collateral when a loan is in default (Hart, 1995). 
However, some jurisdictions make it difficult for those creditors to repossess because this 
entices the liquidation of the firms whereas in some other countries creditors do have the 
power to repossess by exercising their rights on the collaterals (La Porta et al., 1998). In 
either case, lenders or creditors represent a critical constituency for the audit profession in 
terms of the formers’ reliance on audited financial information and their ability to dictate 
terms in lending agreements, inclusive of the identity of the external auditors to be appointed 
and the basis upon which the accounts and its audit ought to be carried out. Interestingly, 
studies relating to the adoption of IFRS do not highlight the relevance of lenders’/borrowers’ 
rights and focus instead on the investors’ or stock market characteristics and/or assume that 
the legal system is consistent in terms of the protection of minority interests, shareholders and 
lenders. Contrastingly, we propose that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between lenders and borrowers rights and the 
extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. 
  
Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or European Union (EU) 
can also pressure a country or organisation in a country to conform to international standards. 
This is evidenced in the recommendations formulated within most World Bank ROSC reports, 
and such recommendations are often linked to the setting of local professional accounting 
bodies and the establishment of a local audit regulator. The adoption of ‘best’ and 
‘international practices’ is often contained within the so-called loan ‘conditionality’ 
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agreements enacted between supra-national institutions and the governments of developing 
countries (e.g. Neu & Ocampo, 2007). Especially in the case where a country faces financial 
distress and where the IMF has provided foreign aid to countries it strongly recommends 
them to also adopt IFRS, corporate governance codes and ISAs. Hassan (2008) suggests that 
coercive pressures may thus arise from foreign aid agreements whereby international 
institutions can influence a country to adopt ‘best practice standards’ (e.g. refer to Ashraf and 
Ghani, 2005). Judge et al., (2010) also concluded that the foreign aid indicator aptly proxies 
for the extent to which nation states may be vulnerable to a variety of outside pressures. 
Whilst foreign aid may be objectively seen as being the outcome of a development policy, we 
would argue that a foreign aid ‘relationship’ incorporates as well, if not more prominently, a 
political and diplomatic dimension, whereby the donor may be able to exercise some power 
and control over the national policies, actions and decisions of the aid recipient. In a similar 
vein, Zeghel & Mhedhbi (2006) contend that the degree of economic openness towards large 
foreign government institutions such as “….world financial institutions” (p.377) can be a 
relevant variable but the authors did not find significant results to support their claim of the 
influence of economic openness on ISA adoption levels (see also results from Archambault & 
Archambault, 2009). Notwithstanding the above, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between foreign aid and the extent of commitment 
to ISA adoption and harmonisation. 
 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when social actors mimic the behaviour of other social 
actors who are perceived as successful in a bid to improve their own legitimacy and 
acceptance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism is considered as a principal 
factor leading to homogenisation (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). In this respect, a country’s 
commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation could be influenced by the presence of 
foreign commercial partners. Wei et al., (2001) state that the more open a country is to 
foreign trade and outside investment, the more it is exposed to ‘international best practices’ 
and consequently may be more inclined to signal a commitment to ISA adoption and 
harmonisation to gain greater legitimacy in the global market. For example, Mennicken’s 
(2008) study does associate the Russian firm’s enthusiasm in implementing ISAs with an 
ambition to become part of the group of internationally recognised audit firms and be able to 
serve the international audit market. Other accounting studies used foreign direct investment, 
foreign market and colonial influence as a predictor of IFRS adoption (Nobes, 1998; Guler et 
al., 2002).  Rodrigues & Craig (2006), cited in Judge et al. (2010), suggest that social systems 
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often emulate the success of others and that this could influence the accounting and auditing 
harmonisation process. Finally, Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) consider how foreign 
trade and investment could reflect the degree to which certain countries are integrated in the 
world economy. By extension, the degree of integration might explain the country’s decision 
to adopt corporate governance codes not only because the code’s implementation can have 
instrumental consequences (better competitiveness, better access to finance) but also provide 
legitimating outcomes for the country as whole (e.g. to be seen as ‘modern’ and ‘professional’ 
economy). Similarly, Archambault & Archambault (2009) find support for the influence of 
net imports on the level of IFRS adoption but this finding was not confirmed by Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi (2006). It could be argued that foreign ownership and import penetration represent 
the ‘conduits’ through which national structures gain greater exposure and share information 
on the harmonisation of ‘best practices’ (Wei et al., 2001), thereby generating mimetic 
behaviours. In light of the above discussion, it is therefore hypothesised that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the prevalence of foreign ownership of 
businesses in a country and the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and 
harmonisation  
H6: There is a positive relationship between the extent of import penetration of a 
country and the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation.  
 
Normative isomorphism refers to the collective values that entail conformity of 
thought and deed within institutional environments (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Two key 
institutions through which collective values and conformity of thought and deed could be 
enacted are the educational system and the political regime/system of the country. Many 
studies in accounting have demonstrated how the political systems and educational level of a 
country can heighten or stifle accounting development (see Nobes, 1983; Gernon et al., 1987; 
Gray, 1988; Zhegal & Mhdehbi, 2006; Archambault & Archambault, 2009). For example, 
Zhegal & Mhdehbi, (2006) suggest that modern accounting systems depend on a nation’s 
educational level. Gernon et al., (1987) contend that there is a positive relationship between 
educational level and the competence of professional auditors. The lack of professional 
education and training is often highlighted in reviews of how progress in the accounting 
and/or auditing field has not materialised (Brody et al., 2005; Al-Awaqleh, 2010; Fraser, 
2010). Our argument is that the commitment ISA adoption and harmonisation requires an 
appreciation of whether there is a sufficient level of competence, both from an academic and 
a professional standpoint, to be able to understand and apply these standards, together with 
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the ability to make professional judgements and process complex information (Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi, 2006). Dow & Karunaratna (2006) argue that the higher the level of education of a 
country the deeper and larger will be its trade, as a result, of adopting international standards. 
Parboteeah et al., (2002) compare the national culture of US and Japanese accounting firms 
and contend that the norms of the accounting profession have a more significant influence on 
accounting practices than the national cultures of the two countries. Mennicken (2008) also 
documents the diverse views of audit professionals from the West and Russia who remain 
divided as to the role of formal education and training in fostering the development of a 
competent auditing professional. Likewise there are many other studies which provide 
support for education as a significant determinant in the adoption of international standards 
(see Guler et al., 2002; Hassan, 2008; Judge et al., 2010). Based on the above, the following 
hypothesis is presented. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between educational attainment of a country and 
the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation.  
 
Nobes (1983) suggests that in addition to social aspects, political factors also impact 
on accounting and reporting system of a country. He describes the difference between the 
accounting and reporting systems of socialist, communist and democratic countries but does 
not provide an empirical validation on the magnitude of the impact of and relationship 
between the different political regimes/systems on the adoption of ISA. Archambault & 
Archambault (2009) did examine the relevance of political systems in explaining IFRS 
adoption but the results were not significant. There is, therefore, no extant evidence on the 
effect of ‘political institutions’. In this paper we contend that different political 
regime/system may have a different impact on the adoption of and commitment to ISA, in 
terms of determining the prevailing political discourse and influence on society. Archambault 
& Archambault (2009) argue that a jurisdiction characterised by democratic principles would 
be more amenable to adopting more stringent rules pertaining to transparency and 
accountability, such as accounting and auditing standards, with a view to hold powerful 
forces to account. A degree of relative political freedom enables diverse parties to hold 
leaders to account. In contrast, countries with political systems with a lower level of civil 
liberties and more state control are less likely to favour the introduction of auditing standards, 
particularly if the these standards are designed and controlled by international institutions. 
We therefore posit the following: 
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H8: There is a positive relationship between political regime/system of a country and 
the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation.  
 
Research design 
Basis of ISA adoption and sampling 
Similar to the case of IFRS (e.g. Ben Othman and Kossentini, 2015), there is no unambiguous 
authoritative source to draw upon to assess whether (and to what degree) countries have 
engaged with ISAs. A composite picture can be developed from the IFAC website, the ROSC 
reports (available on the World Bank website), and regional accounting bodies such as the 
Federation des Experts-Comptables (Federation of Qualified Accountants, for Europe). In the 
main, these organisations rely on surveys or episodic country visits to gather evidence on the 
implementation of ISAs. The main source for our research is IFAC, which surveys its 
member countries on the level of ISA compliance. According to IFAC’s Basis of ISA 
Adoption by Jurisdiction, (IFAC, 2012), countries are classified in four categories namely: (i) 
ISAs are required by law as issued by IAASB, (ii) ISAs are adopted by standard setters; (iii) 
ISAs are adopted with modifications and (iv) ‘other’. The last group refers to three different 
circumstances namely: (i) countries for which available information is not adequate to 
evaluate whether the local adoption process, including the translation of ISAs into a local 
language is reasonably up to date with the translation lags of a year; (ii) jurisdictions which 
indicate that the local generally accepted auditing standards is “based on” or “similar to” the 
ISAs, but it is unclear whether modifications to, or other differences from, the ISAs meet the 
requirements of the IAASB Modifications Policy; (iii) Countries which have ‘declared’ a 
commitment to convergence with ISAs as an objective but still have some way to go before 
achieving this objective.  
In order to gather more updated information on the fourth category we have perused 
the SMO Action Plans of IFAC (2009-2015) of each country in order to determine how their 
ISA ‘status’ have evolved between 2009 and 2012. While there are some countries that have 
not adopted ISAs until 2012, a few others have committed to adopt after 2012. An 
explanatory note is given at the end of Table 2 on countries committed to adopt ISA after 
2012. As our study investigates ISA adoption up to 2012, we have considered countries 
committed to adopt ISA after 2012 as non-adopters for the purpose of our statistical analysis. 
Drawing from the IFAC classification and how the extent of harmonisation was measured by 
Ben Othman and Kossentini (2015; refer to Section 4.2.2, p. 79-80) in the case of IFRS, our 
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ISA adoption variable is an ordinal variable, reflecting a different extent of commitment to 
full ISA harmonisation, leading to the following five main groups of countries , namely. 4: 
ISAs are required by law, 3: ISAs are adopted by national standard setters, 2: ISAs are 
adopted with modification, 1: others and 0: countries not adopting ISAs. It is important to 
highlight that this scale does not imply that one country is least or most advanced but rather 
how each country positions its level of engagement with regards to international 
harmonization of auditing practices at a point in time. This ordinal scale does not necessarily 
imply that a country classified as ‘4’ will be more compliant in practice or de facto lead to 
better audit quality. For instance, according to a ROSC (2012) report for Honduras (classified 
as ‘4’), this country needs to make a continued effort to align with international best practice 
whereas Australia (also a ‘4’) is praised for having incorporated ISAs with some differences 
into its national standards and/or related other pronouncements (Action Plan, CPA Australia, 
p. 182).  
There are forty-eight countries whose status has changed from 2009 to 2012. For example 
Croatia and Lithuania were classified as ‘1’ in 2009 but moved to ‘4’ in 2012, Ukraine from 
‘1’ to ‘3’ and Chile which was in category 2 decided not to adopt ISA in 2012. There are 
twelve countries that have not adopted ISA by 2012, of which six countries committed to 
adopt after 2012. These six countries have therefore not adopted ISAs by 2012 and we 
classified as non-adopters (‘0’). Table 2 summarises the status of ISA adoption in 2012 for 
only eighty-nine countries due to the fact that our empirical analysis focuses on the countries 
where we have available data with regards to the independent variables.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We then break down the sample into three panels namely: Panel B (77 countries) 
which excludes non-adopters, Panel C (73 countries) which excludes non-adopters and those 
committed to adopt ISA after 2012, Panel D (63 countries) which excludes non-adopters, 
those committed to adopt after 2012 and countries for which information is inadequate. The 
results of these three Panels are reported in Table 9.  There are 72 countries that have adopted 
Clarity ISAs and the results are reported in Table 10. The distribution of the respective 
                                                            
2
 https://www.ifac.org/system/files/compliance-
assessment/part_3/201403%20Australia%20CPA.pdf 
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samples is reported in Table 2.1 ((refer to sensitivity s analysis for a discussion of the 
relevant results).   
INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Data sources for variables 
In addition to the data sources explained above, this study relies on (1) the Global 
Competitiveness Reports (2009-2012) by the World Economic Forum (WEF), (2) the World 
Bank Reports (2002–2010) on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) for a large 
number of countries, (3) The World Bank’s World Development Indicators, (2009-2012), and 
(4) the Economic Intelligence Unit Reports (2008-2012)The data is collected for four years 
2009 to 2012. These data sources have been relied upon in various economic, management 
and accounting studies as well as for the preparation of national, regional and international 
reports e.g. Porter et al., (2005, 2001), Sachs (2003), Blank & Lopez-Claros (2004) and 
Houqe et al., (2012). With regards to the WEF dataset, Black and Carnes (2006) use the data 
to analyse and report the relationship among macroeconomic factors and accounting system 
whereas Francis et al., (2001) use the dataset to relate investor protection laws, accounting 
and auditing around the world. Zeghal & Mhedhbi (2006) use similar databases to investigate 
the determinants of the adoption of international accounting standards in developing 
countries whereas Judge et al., (2010) focuses on IFRS adoption globally. Lastly, Boolaky et 
al., (2013) use the same dataset for 2009 to investigate the determinants of the strength of 
auditing and reporting standards across the globe. 
 
Variable description 
Extent of ISA Adoption: We define this variable as ISAADOPT and adopt the approach 
previously described to assess the extent to which a given country commitments to full ISA 
harmonisation.  
The status of “Clarity ISAs” is then considered because it was an important 
development by IFAC (Humphrey et al., 2009). For this purpose, a dichotomous approach is 
preferred whereby a country is coded as “1” if it has adopted ISA Clarity Standards and “0” if 
not. This is empirically modelled as part of a logistic regression analysis (refer to Table 10). 
The independent variables used to proxy for the institutional pressures are categorised in 
terms of the nature of the isomorphism.  
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Coercive Isomorphism: There are many variables which can proxy for this factor (e.g. 
measures concerned with the rule of law, common vs. civil law systems, but as in the case by 
Judge et al., (2010), not all of them could be included in the analysis due to the potential for 
high multi-collinearity. For this reason only four variables that have passed the collinearity 
test have been included in the models. They are depicted below. 
 
Lenders and Borrowers rights (LBRIGHTS):  We use the annual legal right index of a 
country as published in the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World Economic Forum 
2009-2012. It represents the degree of legal protection of lenders and borrowers in country 
and is measured on a scale of 0-10.  
 
Foreign Aid (FORAID) is sourced from the World Bank Indicators (World Bank 2009-
2012). Drawing from Judge et al., (2010), it is measured as the annual proportion of foreign 
aid relative to gross domestic product over the period 2009-2012.  
 
Protection of Minority Interest (PMIS): This paper uses the yearly score of the protection 
of minority interests in a country as published by the Global Competitiveness Reports of the 
World Economic Forum (2009-2012).  
 
Regulatory Enforcement (REGENF): REGENF is an annual regulatory enforcement index 
per country and is sourced from the World Justice Project 2009-2012, and it measures the 
extent to which regulations are fairly and effectively implemented and enforced (The World 
Justice Project, 2012/3). The Regulatory Enforcement variable is computed using a scale of 0 
to 1 where 1 means the highest score and 0 the lowest score. This enforcement index is 
constructed on the basis of five variables reported by the World Justice Project namely: 1. 
Government regulations are effectively enforced 2. Government regulations are applied and 
enforced without improper influence, 3. Administrative proceedings are conducted without 
unreasonable delay, 4. Due process is respected in administrative proceedings, 5. The 
Government does not expropriate without adequate compensation.  
 
 
Mimetic Isomorphism: mimetic isomorphism arises when a corporations in a country 
mimics the behaviour of another successful corporation(s) /trading partner(s) such as 
suppliers and foreign companies or foreign owners.  There are many variables which would 
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fall under the umbrella of mimetic isomorphism, but the presence of high collinearity 
restrains us to only two of them, namely: import penetration and prevalence of foreign 
ownership. They are described below. 
 
IMPOPEN is the import penetration and sourced from the World Bank Development 
Indicators 2009-2012. It is the ratio of import value of commodities sold as a proportion of 
the gross domestic product for the years 2009-2012. POFO is the annual score on the 
prevalence of foreign ownership as published by the WEF. This is measured on a scale of 1-7.  
 
Normative Isomorphism: For this study, the proxies for educational attainment (HET) are 
drawn from the WEF dataset 2009-2012.  This is the tertiary enrolment score as published by 
the WEF during the period 2009-2012. It is expected that countries with a highest score of 
HET are more exposed to and influenced by professional standards (Judge et al., 2010). 
Finally we use the Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit as proxy 
for political regime/systems. The Economist Intelligence Unit (ECU) democracy index 
provides a scale of 0-10, based on the ratings of 60 indicators grouped into five categories, 
namely: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0-10 scale and the 
overall index of democracy is a simple average of the five category indices (EIU, 2012, p.27). 
The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimesvii, i.e. Full 
democracies (scores 8-10); flawed democracies (scores 6-7.9), hybrid regime (scores 4-5.9) 
and authoritarian regimes (scores below 4) (EIU, 2012, p. 28) 
 
Control Variables: The predominant role of IOSCO in the IFRS and ISA development 
agenda (Humphrey et al., 2009; Humphrey & Loft, 2013; Judge et al., 2010) underlines the 
importance of capital markets globally as international investors seek to identify 
opportunities in a number of developed and emerging markets. Needles et al. (2002) mention 
that capital markets have consistently advocated greater harmony in accounting recognition, 
measurement and disclosure and in auditing standards to ensure that greater economic 
efficiencies can be obtained from the operation of global financial centres (2002, p. 185). As 
mentioned at the outset, greater attention by international agencies on accounting and 
auditing aspects arose as a result of large investor losses in the emerging markets at the end 
of the 1990s. This prompted debates worldwide as to the quality and comparability of 
accounting information to ensure continued confidence in the financial system and the flow 
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of investment mainly via capital markets. Hence, principally from an efficiency motive, the 
extent of ISA adoption may improve the level of investor confidence and may therefore be 
related to the extent to which capital markets contribute to national economic development. 
Hence, as in the case of IFRS (Judge et al., 2010, p. 165), one might expect a positive 
association between the annual market capitalisation MKCAP (as a percentage of gross 
domestic product from 2009 to 2012) and the country’s extent of ISA adoption.  
Secondly, the rate of economic growth has been found to be positively correlated with 
accounting quality (Mueller et al., 2004). Within a capitalist system, the productive sector of 
the economy relies on the supply of scarce capital resources to industries and firms that have 
the potential to grow and provide suitable rates of return to equity investors at a given risk 
level. Accounting information prepared and verified according to auditing standards enables 
resources to the directed to these more profitable areas of the economy whilst the considering 
the risk profiles of these investments. Again, from an efficiency perspective, Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi (2006) found that economic growth in developing countries has been associated 
with IFRS adoption. In a similar vein, we therefore expect a positive association between the 
average rate of economic growth - GDP Growth - (annual growth rate in gross national 
income from 2009 to 2012) and the extent of ISA adoption. A description of the variables of 
interests and their association to the various institutional pressures is presented in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Lastly, we incorporate other control variables for the sensitivity analysis stage. JUDI is used 
to measure judicial independence of a country, whilst EOLFW is used to measure the 
efficiency of legal framework of a country. Furthermore, prior cross-country studies, 
informed by Hofstede’s national culture scores (Ding et al., 2005; Hope et al., 2006; and 
Clements et al., 2010, among others) suggests that differences in a national culture such as 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance may influence the commitment to adoption and 
harmonisation to IFRS . On this basis, we also investigated, as a part of a sensitivity analysis, 
whether these two cultural scores significantly influence a country’s extent of commitment to 
adopt and seek harmonisation to ISAs and therefore, how would these variables would 
change the explanatory power of the model. We report the results in Model 15 of Table 11. 
 
Empirical Model 
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To evaluate how neo-institutional pressures influence the extent of commitment to 
ISA adoption and harmonisation at the country level, several regression techniques are 
employed. The analytical method used to test the hypotheses involves the estimation of the 
following general form equation for a data set of 89 countries from 2009 to 2012 (356 
observations):  
 
Model 1: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 POLSYS + β5 HET +  β6 LBRIGHTS 
+ β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   MKCAP  
 
We begin by running the above base regression controlling for GDP growth and 
market capitalisation using an OLS model. The results are reported in Model 1 of Table 6. In 
order to determine the robustness of the models, we then compared the results from the 
pooled regression with the two other regression techniques (multinomial and logistic 
regressions) in Model 2 & 3 respectively of Table 6. 
Since the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation has more than 
two categories, a multinomial regression is also justified to investigate the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables in order to determine the robustness of this 
relationship (Judge et al., 2010). Below is the equation for model 2. The results are reported 
in Table 6 (Model2). 
 
Model 2: log(Pij/Pi1)= β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS  + β3 FORAID + β4 HET + 
 β5 LBRIGHTS +  β6 IMPOPEN +  β7 POFO + β8 GDPGrowth + β9  MKCAP + ε 
 (Pij is the probability that a country chooses one of the 5 categories of ISA adoption basis 
using one category as a base line or reference; i is the i th individual and  j is the jth category 
of the dependent variable. It is necessary to make one of the categories the baseline category 
and in this case (j = 1). 
 
Relying on Judge et al. (2010), we also re-classify the original five classification of 
ISA adoption into two binary measures ‘1’ = ISA is adopted and ‘0’ ISA is not adopted.) A 
binary logistic regression is then used to fit the model. The equation for this model is given 
hereunder. The results are reported in Table 6 (Model 3). A similar approach is used to 
investigate the drivers of clarity standard (72 countries only) and the equation is given at the 
bottom of Table 10. 
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Model 3: (/( − ) = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS  + β3 FORAID + β4 HET + 
 β5 LBRIGHTS + β6 IMPOPEN +  β7 POFO + β8 GDPGrowth + β9  MKCAP + ε 
Pi is the probability of adopting the Clarity ISAs. It is equal to Log (pi/1-pi) where pi = probability of 
a country adopting ISAs and 1-pi = 1 – probability of a country not adopting ISAs. 
  
We subsequently ran two different fixed effects models: (i) Year Fixed Effects  with 
year specific dummy variables controlling mainly for the time period and (ii) Country Fixed 
Effect with country specific dummy variables. The purpose is to reduce the effects of omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity. The Year Fixed Effect Model determines the impact of time 
and Country Fixed Effect Model the impact of country on the ISA commitment and adoption 
variable. For the country fixed effect regression firstly we have used individual countries as 
dummies and ran the regression. The results (not reported here) show an Adjusted R square 
0f 77.1% but with a high level of multi-collinearity. Secondly in order to eliminate the 
presence of multi-collinearity we reduced the number of dummies by clustering the countries 
into developed, developing and emerging. The fixed effect equation is provided at the bottom 
of Table 7.  We then report the results in Models 4 & 5 to compare with Model 1 in Table 7. 
Since the political system variable comprises of four different types, we have also dealt with 
them one at a time to be able to identify the impact of each system on the extent of 
commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. The results are reported in Models 6 to 9 of 
Table 8.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
We report the descriptive statistics on the variables of interest in Table 4. The mean 
(median) of ISA adoption (ISAADOP) scaled by category is 1.944 (2.091) respectively. From 
Table 4, we first note that ISA adoption on a legal basis (law or regulation) is not 
predominant amongst most countries. This reconciles with column 1 of Table 2 which 
reported that only 11 countries adopted ISAs in law by the end of 2012. All the countries 
having done so are developing countries, and are mainly countries from the transitional 
European region. The second tier relates to the case where ISA has been adopted by the 
national standard setter and there is in this case a diversity of countries (developed / 
developing) relying on this level of commitment to ISA harmonisation. A similar diverse 
constituency can be observed for the third category (ISAs adopted but modified), signalling a 
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lower of commitment to global ISA harmonisation. Finally, it is noticeable that the United 
States has not effectively engaged with ISAs, and we contend that this reflects the relatively 
unique and dominant role of the country in global economics and politics, thereby making it a 
rather idiosyncratic case in a study informed by a neo-institutional perspective. The 
predominance of higher commitment to ISA harmonisation by developing and emerging 
economies is arguably not surprising in light of the initial concerns arising from the Asian 
financial crisis and the fact that international agencies and standard-setters have taken 
particular attention to developing and emerging economies with a bid to ‘modernise’ the 
countries’ financial architecture(Humphrey et al., 2009).  
Regulatory enforcement (REGENF), measured on a scale of 0-1 has a mean and 
median of 0.479 and 0.701 respectively, which suggests that regulatory enforcement is on 
average just below50%. Protection on minority interest (PMIS), as measured on a scale of 1-7 
has a mean of 4.401 with a median of 4.756.  Political system (POLSYS) is measured on a 
scale of 1-10 and reports an average of 6.267 which falls within the band of flawed 
democracy according to the Economic Intelligence Unit. The tertiary enrolment rate has a 
mean of 38.56 but reveals a significant variation of 1.932. Lenders and borrowers rights 
(LBRIGHTS) have a mean of 5.722 on a scale of 0-10. This implies that 57% of the countries 
exercise full lenders and borrowers rights. Import penetration (IMPROPEN) and) have a 
mean of 41.75 and prevalence of foreign ownership (POFO a mean of 4.946 respectively, 
measured on a scale from 1 to 7).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to ensure that our regression results are not unduly influenced by the presence 
of multi-collinearity, we performed two multi-collinearity tests. First we have computed the 
Tolerance valueviii and any variable with a value that is less than 0.1 is removed from the 
model. Second we have counter-checked the Tolerance value by calculating the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and any variable greater than 9 is removed from the model (Field, 
2000). As a result, we have reduced our set of independent variables excluding the control 
variables to only eight as follows: four for coercive isomorphism (Regulatory Enforcement, 
Protection of Minority Interests, Lenders/Borrowers’ Rights and Foreign Aid), two for 
mimetic isomorphism (Import penetration and Prevalence of Foreign Ownership) and two for 
normative isomorphism (Educational attainment and political system). We have also verified 
the normality assumptions for all the independent variables and there was no severe issue of 
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skewness/kurtosis. Given the size of our sample neither skewness nor kurtosis is expected to 
have a significant effect on the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
We report the mean values (2009-2012) of country-level variables in Table 5. 
Regulatory enforcement scores are high in Sweden (0.90), Japan (0.80), Denmark (0.85), 
Austria (0.84) and Australia (0.83). Ukraine (0.2), Zimbabwe (0.1) and Cameron (0.2), 
Venezuela (0.2), Colombia (0.5) and Bolivia (0.4) are reported as jurisdictions where the 
enforcement of regulations is weak. Protection of minority interest is stronger in Sweden 
(6.00), Finland (5.90), South Africa (5.60), and Norway (5.80) whereas Russia (3.20), 
Ukraine (3.0), Bosnia (2.90) and Kyrgyztan (3.1) have the weakest protection of minority 
shareholders interest. Countries with high lenders and borrowers’ rights’ scores are Albania, 
Australia, Singapore, South Africa, New Zealand, Hong Kong Ukraine, Malaysia and UK but 
countries such as Malta, Madagascar and Venezuela and Bolivia have the lowest of the 
average scores on protection of minority interest. Countries with higher import penetration 
scores (higher that 75%) are namely: Belgium, Estonia, Hong Kong, Kygyztan, Singapore, 
and Vietnam but low in Argentina, Bosnia, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
and lowest in Croatia at an average of 7.3%. With regards to the level of higher education, 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Slovenia, Ukraine and UK have on average a 
higher tertiary enrolment rate. For the political system, 19 countries have a score of equal to 
or more than 8 which therefore qualify them as fully democratic countries and 13 countries as 
classified as autocratic.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Results of empirical models  
Pooled Regression 
We report the results of the statistical models to empirically test the hypotheses (see 
Table 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). Table 6 reports the results from three models. Model 1 is the base 
linear regression. The total variance explained by the model is 21.5% (Adjusted R Square 
0.215). Seven of the eight institutional factors are reported to be statistically positively 
associated with higher commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. All the four coercive 
pressures are reported to be statistically significant drivers thus supporting Hypotheses 1 to 4 
(H1-H4). Lenders and borrowers’ rights are reported to be significantly positively related to 
the dependent variable (t = 7.463, p < .01), thus supporting hypothesis (H3). This is reported 
for the first time in the accounting literature, in contrast to an emphasis on donor country 
(Judge et al. 2010) and investor protection (La Porta et al., (1998, 2006). Our findings 
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suggests that because lenders’ rights are arguably more complex than shareholder rights (La 
Porta et al., 1998), countries may be inclined to signal a higher commitment to ISAs in a bid 
to enhance the lenders’ trust on the quality and reliability of financial statements. Hence, 
secured creditors (lenders) would appear to signal that the accounts of borrowers need to be 
audited in line with ISAs.  
  
Foreign aid also reveals a positive significant relationship with the ISA variable (t = 3.821, p 
< .01), thus supporting hypothesis (H4). Similar to Judge et al., (2010) and Hassan (2008) 
who found countries which have been funded by the international institutions tend to adopt 
IFRS, our model also reports that those countries would also signal a greater commitment to 
full ISA adoption.  Regulatory enforcement is significant at (t = 2.638, p <.01). This supports 
hypothesis (2). It indicates, ceteris paribus, that countries with stronger regulatory 
enforcement are more likely to a higher commitment to ISA. For example, Austria, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden are countries with a high score of regulatory enforcement and have also 
adopted ISAs. The protection of minority interest is significantly related with ISA (t = 3.177, 
p < .01), thus supporting hypothesis (1). Hence, the findings from hypotheses 1 to 4 support 
the theory that coercive pressures from a combination of resource providers (debt holders, 
foreign aid) and legal structures (rules and enforcement) leads to a higher extent of 
commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. For example, the majority of countries with 
a regulatory enforcement scores greater than 0.5 have either adopted ISAs as a basis in law or 
by standard setters.  
 
With regards to mimetic pressures, only the prevalence of foreign ownership (t = 4.673, p 
<.01) is found to be a significant determinant of the extent of commitment to ISA adoption 
and harmonisation, thus supporting hypothesis (5). This result suggests countries that are 
more opened to foreign corporate ownership are more influenced to seek full harmonisation 
with international practices (Wei et al. (2001), potentially arising from the use of those 
standards in other countries. However, contrary to our expectation, import penetration 
(t= .940; p > .10) is not significant though positively related to the ISA variable. Hypothesis 6 
is not therefore supported. From a theoretical perspective, the dynamics underlying mimetic 
pressures are quite complex particularly in relation to sovereign nations and 
political/diplomatic considerations may often outweigh commercial interests to harmonise 
accounting, auditing and financial practices and thereby do not necessarily lead to similar 
intentions to commit and adopt particular standards. The influence and power of national 
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professional accountancy and auditing bodies may also mediate calls for harmonisation. On a 
different note, it may also be argued that the selected variable on the import of commodities 
and as such it may not be able to proxy adequately for mimetic pressures arising from the 
involvement of foreign participants in the local economy, particularly in terms of investment, 
and the prominence of financial services.  
 
Both normative pressures are found to be positively associated to the extent of commitment 
to ISA adoption and. Education is statistically significant (t = 2.011, p<.05), thus supporting 
hypothesis (7). Similar to Zhegal & Mhdehbi (2006), Brody et al. (2005), Fraser (2010) and 
Dow & Karunaratna (2006) our findings confirm that the educational level influences the 
signal to commit to higher extent of ISA harmonisation. The political system in general is 
statistically significant (t = 3.716, p < .01), thus supporting hypothesis (8). Similar to Nobes 
(1983) and Archambault & Archambault (2009) who contended that a political system does 
impact on accounting systems and standards, our result also suggests that the nation’s 
political system or regime has a significant association with the extent of commitment to ISA 
adoption and harmonisation. However, Archambault & Archambault (2009) also argue that 
countries with a lower level of civil liberties and more State control are less likely to favour 
the introduction of auditing standards. Bearing this in mind, we have unpacked this variable 
into four sub variables, namely: full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime and 
autocracy and then investigated which of them is mostly significant. We report and discuss 
the results in Table 8. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Fixed Effect Regressions 
We report year fixed effect and country fixed effect regression results in Models 4 & 5 of 
Table 7. The findings suggest that there is no significant time-effect on the extent of 
commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation and its determinants. None of the variable of 
interest has lost significance and all remain significant at least at .05 level. There is also no 
material change in the magnitude of the coefficients. However, findings from the country 
fixed effect regression suggest that the country does impact on ISA adoption and its 
determinants. This is evident when we consider the changes in the significance of the variable 
of interest in Model 5. Six out of the eight variables of interest have lost significance. They 
are regulatory enforcement, protection of minority interest, education, foreign aid, import 
penetration and prevalence of foreign ownership. Weak regulatory enforcement, protection of 
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minority interest and relatively low education level are less likely to influence ISA adoption 
at a country level. Likewise it is less likely that the decision to commit to adopt ISA is low in 
countries that are more self-dependent (i.e. does not rely too much on imports) and where 
there is a lack of the presence of foreign corporate bodies or foreign investment. Thirty-nine 
out of the eighty-nine countries in this study are in the category of developing and emerging 
markets but have committed highly to ISA either in law, via standard setters or with 
modifications. From the eleven countries that have adopted ISA in law, 10 are developing 
and one is an emerging country.  
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Effects of Political Systems 
 We report the impact of the four different political regimes on ISA adoption in Models 6, 7, 
8, & 9 of Table 8. The results suggest that both full democratic jurisdiction and a flawed one 
are equally likely to commit to adopt ISA. The results are reported in Model 6 for full 
democracy and Model 7 for flawed democracy. Full democracy is significant at (t=2.486, p 
< .05) and flawed democracy significant at (t = 2.212, p < .05), This finding chimes well 
with Archambault & Archambault (2009) who contend that democratic jurisdictions are more 
likely to signal a higher commit to ISA harmonisation and adopt rules pertaining to 
transparency and accountability, such as accounting and auditing standards, with a view to 
hold powerful forces to account. Neither the hybrid regime nor the autocratic regime is 
reported to be statistically significant and they are negatively associated with the ISA variable. 
  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Robustness tests 
To further test for the robustness of the results from Model 1, we use different estimation 
techniques to investigate the impact of the independent variables on the extent of 
commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation and report them in Model 2 and 3 in Table 6. 
Model 2 is a multinomial regression. All four variables representing coercive pressures 
(Protection of Minority Interests, Lenders/Borrowers’ Rights, Foreign Aid and Regulatory 
Enforcement) remain statistically significant at a level of at least (p<.05). With regards to the 
mimetic pressures, both the prevalence of foreign ownership and import penetration are 
reported to be statistically significant.at (p<.05). Similarly, the tertiary education level (p<.05) 
and the political system (p<.01) positively influence the extent of commitment to ISA 
adoption and harmonisation. Overall, the results from the multinomial regression support our 
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prediction about the neo-institutional perspective in terms of how countries commit to ISA 
adoption. Lastly, model 3 is a binary logistic regression, whereby we re-categorise ISA 
adoption into a dichotomous variable. Countries that have adopted ISA under any of the first 
three bases (in law, by standard setters or with modification) are considered as ISA adopters 
and therefore categorised as “1” or “0” otherwise. The reason behind this categorisation is 
that these countries have somehow substantially committed to ISAs as opposed to others who 
have not or those where the ISA adoption / commitment status is unclear. The results from 
Model 3 confirm our prior results by also reporting that at least one variable from each of the 
coercive pressure are statistically significant. However, education, foreign aid and prevalence 
of foreign ownership have become moderately significant. Lenders/borrowers rights, political 
system and import penetration are still highly significant at a level of (p <.05). In conclusion, 
the tests from the different models still support the main results of the study.  
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In order to extend the robustness tests discussed above, we have conducted a sensitivity 
analysis using linear regressions for a further seven models (Models 10-16 The results are 
reported in Table 9, 10 and 11. The results for Panel B are reported in Model 10, Panel C in 
Model 11 and Panel D in Model 12. Model 13 reports the findings for the adoption of clarity 
standards. Panel B (Table 2.1 , column 2) includes data for four categories of countries (i) 
ISA adopted in law, (ii) ISA adopted by standard setters, (iii) ISA adopted with modification 
and (iv) countries for which information are inadequate and excludes non-adopters. Panel C 
(Table 2.1, column 3) excludes the sum of Panel B data less number of countries committed 
to adopt ISA post 2012 and Panel D (Table 2.1, column 4) is the sum of Panel C data, 
excluding countries with inadequate information. The results for Panel B suggests that three 
of the coercive pressures are equally significant except foreign aid which is positively but not 
statistically significantly related with ISA adoption. Both of the normative pressures (political 
system and education) are equally significant whereas for the mimetic pressures prevalence 
of foreign ownership remain significant. For Panel C, the significance of the coercive 
pressures is for all four variables but only the tertiary enrolment rate is reported to be 
significant as a normative pressure. Again the prevalence of foreign ownership remains a 
statistically significant determinant of ISA adoption. In the Panel D analysis, the regression 
reports that all the coercive and normative pressures are significant but the prevalence of 
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foreign ownership remains the most prevalent determinant with a moderate level of 
significance. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 13 in Table 10 reports the regression results for ISA adoption. The findings are close 
to the original findings in Model 1 which suggests that the three types of institutional 
pressures influence the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation.  
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
To conclude, Model 14 incorporates two of La Porta et al.’s (2006) variables, namely judicial 
independence and efficiency of legal framework and Model 15, two Hofstede’s (1984) 
cultural scores namely: power distance and uncertainty avoidance as control variables since 
previous research has advocated that these may influence accounting standards and practices 
(Ding et al, 2005; Hope et al., 2006; Clement et al., 2010; Judge et al., 2010). Model 16 
incorporates both La Porta et al.’s and Hofstede’s variables together. When comparing the 
results across the three models, it is noted that the effect of the institutional pressures are still 
present, except for the case of foreign aid being no longer a significant variable. While 
incorporating La Porta et al.’s (2006) variables, Model 14 in Table 11 suggests that judicial 
independence and efficiency of legal framework are also not significant determinants of the 
extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. But the other independent 
variables tested remain significant though at different levels. This suggests that the 
institutional pressures identified in this study are equally important, particularly in relation to 
coercive pressures. In Model 15, similar findings are reported but the results also suggest that 
cultural values/scores of a country do not influence the ISA decision. This is further 
confirmed in Model 16 from Table 11. This is significant in that Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions have been extensively relied upon in a number of accounting studies but the use 
of these dimensions in quantitative research has increasingly been questioned (e.g. 
Baskerville, 2003).  
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
Many countries have been adopting ISAs fully whilst others have been adopting the 
standards on a partial basis or not at all. The basis upon which ISAs are adopted varies 
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considerably between countries and this has been a subject of criticism (Fraser, 2010). From a 
functionalist perspective, these differences can have important implications for national 
corporate governance practices and outcomes, multinational corporations, and cross-border 
investment and trade (Millar et al., 2003; Judge et al., 2010) because ISAs are seen to be an 
important control mechanism in the production of relevant, reliable and comparable financial 
statements. From a neo-institutional perspective however, differences in the level of 
commitment to ISA harmonisation highlight a motivation to study empirically the relevance 
of national social, political and cultural factors, as initially informed by the existing work on 
the level of IFRS adoption and harmonisation (e.g. Ben Othman and Kossentini, 2015) and 
the implementation of corporate governance codes worldwide.  
Our findings provide empirical evidence to support our theoretical framework of neo-
institutional pressures on the extent of commitment to ISA adoption and harmonisation. We 
find that the coercive, mimetic and normative pressures represent significant forces 
encouraging or impeding ISA harmonisation. In particular, amongst the four coercive-led 
variables (lenders/borrowers rights, foreign aid, regulatory enforcement, protection of 
minority interests), the first variable appears to exert a stronger influence on the extent of ISA 
adoption. Insofar as mimetic isomorphism is concerned, both variables (prevalence of foreign 
ownership and import penetration) appear to be good predictors for the extent of ISA 
adoption. Educational attainment, as a normative isomorphism, is also a significant 
determinant of the commitment to ISA harmonisation similar to the political system. 
However it is to be noted that for countries with less civil liberties such as autocratic 
countries and those with a hybrid system, the propensity to commit to full ISA harmonisation 
is rather low. Moreover,, the results, whilst supporting Simunic et al.’s, (2013) assessment of 
the drivers of ISA adoption, also show the impact of a number of different social, political 
and economic factors which were yet to be validated in previous accounting studies, notably 
in relation to IFRS adoption.   
These findings are of relevance to the practitioners and academics currently engaged 
in the debate how to address cross-country variability in the adoption and implementation of 
accounting and auditing standards. They are also very important to professional educators to 
whom the responsibility to provide continuous education and training on ISA has been 
assigned as per the SMO Action Plan. We argue that prescriptions spearheaded by 
international agencies (IFAC, IOSCO, World Bank, IMF) to strengthen the national 
enforcement and regulatory structures for audit practice are often driven by a normative 
‘logic’ (e.g. an independent audit regulator ‘ought’ to work in all circumstances) and a ‘one-
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size fits-all’ approach. Our results show that whilst many of the hypothesised institutional 
factors do matter, it does not mean that the same micro-prescriptions will adequately 
somehow challenge the institutional structures in the same way and ensure all countries move 
towards a similar basis of ISA adoption and implementation. For instance, the heightened 
effect of lenders and borrowers right is notable since most of the mainstream discourse about 
accounting standards has focused on the implications for equity holders. However, it is 
arguable that debt holders, particularly in the prevailing context post-financial crisis, have 
more concerns about the increased risks of relying on financial information deemed to have 
been audited using the ‘best’ auditing standards. As also suggested by Humphrey et al., (2009, 
p. 822), recent criticisms of audit practice in the context of a number of failed financial 
institutions have raised questions as to the usefulness of the audit process.  
Furthermore, the contribution of this study lies in the evidence relating to cross-
country models of commitment to harmonisation of standards, adoption and implementation. 
The neo-institutional perspective has been gaining ground in the financial accounting arena, 
specifically in the case of IFRS adoption (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; Rahman et al., 2010), as 
it becomes increasingly clear that the adoption or implementation is not only motivated by 
the promise of efficiency gains (e.g. lower cost of capital, higher levels of market 
capitalisation, economic growth) but also by the need to derive legitimacy, such that the 
organisation, industry or the State can be seen to be worthy of support (e.g.; Judge et al., 2010; 
Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009; Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). 
Based on the empirical results and their relative robustness and the relatively scarce number 
of studies on ISA adoption, we recommend further attention on the way ISA implementation 
is actually supported and enforced by the local audit profession and regulators. In particular, 
many of these audit regulators have been established in developing countries where the 
capacity and expertise needed to regulate large accounting firms (e.g. branches of the Big 4 
firms) may be insufficient. In effect, even if ISA adoption levels are enhanced, we would 
argue that additional attention must be paid to the work of the audit regulators and the related 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Notwithstanding the above, the empirical nature of the study implies some limitations. 
First the data is mainly country-level data and it has been quite difficult to gauge the extent to 
which particular countries are committed to greater harmonisation with ISAs. The IFAC 
collected these country-level data through survey/questionnaires and as an example, we 
question whether the use of the ‘other’ category is a subtle ‘impression management’ strategy 
for countries and IFAC to avoid disclosing an ‘official’ state of non-compliance. Hence, 
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although access to the questionnaires may be possible, the validity and reliability of the data 
is unknown and only partially validated by the various country ROSC reports. Second there is 
no publicly available data on the actual use of ISAs by individual audit firms. These 
limitations do provide directions for future research. To overcome the limitation(s), the 
adoption and use of ISAs can be investigated using field research, similar to the work 
undertaken by Mennicken (2008). Finally, close research attention must also be paid to the 
work carried out by local regulators to understand how (if at all) they ensure that audit firms 
and auditors actually implement ISAs.  
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i
 International Organisation of Securities’ Commissions.  
ii
 In 2004 IAASB issued a policy statement ‘Clarifying Professional Requirements in International Standards 
Issued by the IAASB’. That was followed by a Consultation Paper ‘Improving the Clarity and Structure of 
IAASB Standards and related Considerations for Practice Statements’.  The ISAs were then put through a 
“clarification” process and in 2006 the clarity of a number of ISAs (eg. ISAs 240, 330, 315, 600) were 
completed and named “Clarified ISAs”, hence the term ‘Clarity Standards’.  
iii
 We acknowledge the suggestion of one of the reviewer with regards to this point.  
iv
 Needles et al., (2002) also documents the early endorsement of ISAs by IOSCO  in 1992 but given the latter’s 
continued concerns about the standards and the related standard setting process, this endorsement was allowed 
to lapse.    
v
 Although one of Humphrey et al.’s (2009) main contentions has been the ability of the major international 
accounting firms to ‘manage’ the global auditing standards-setting process. 
vi
 As mentioned by Humphrey et al. (2009, p. 340), it is quite telling and ironic, in the context of the recent 
financial crisis, that there is no ROSC report on the United States or Iceland.  
vii
 Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but 
these will also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The 
functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent and diverse. There is an effective system of 
checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited 
problems in the functioning of democracies. 
Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there are problems (such as 
infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties will be respected. However, there are significant 
weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political 
culture and low levels of political participation. 
Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both 
free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses 
are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, functioning of government and political 
participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically 
there is harassment of and pressure on journalists and the judiciary is not independent. 
Authoritarian regimes: In these states state political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many 
countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these 
have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and 
infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling 
regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent 
judiciary. (Source: EIU, Democracy Index, 2012, p.28). 
 
viii
 A Tolerance value less than 0.1 indicates a correlation of 0.9 and a VIF value of greater than 9 also indicates 
a correlation of 0.9. This suggests a high incidence of collinearity between the independent variables. 
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Table 1 (2001-2012): Common Auditing problems based on ROSC reports 
List of Problems List of countries (date of ROSC reports) 
Lack of public oversight of the profession Benin (2009), Botswana (2006), Burkina Faso 
(2010),Burundi (2007), Ivory Coast (2009), Ethiopia 
(2007), The Gambia (2010), Ghana (2004), Kenya 
(2010), Madagascar (2008), Malawi (2007), 
Mozambique (2008), Uganda (2005), Zambia (2007), 
Latvia (2005), Slovakia, Slovenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2004), Hungary (2004), Lithuania 
(2007), Bulgaria (2008) 
ISA Translation not equivalent Macedonia FYR (2003), Montenegro (2007), Russia, 
Slovakia (2001), Slovenia (2004), Serbia (2005), Czec 
Republic (2003), Poland (2005) 
Specific ISAs (see note 1 & 2 in the Table below) Benin(2009), Botswana (2006), Burkina Faso 
(2010),Burundi (2007), Ivory Coast (2009), Ethiopia 
(2007), The Gambia (2010), Ghana (2004), Kenya 
(2010), Madagascar (2008), Malawi (2007), 
Mozambique (2008), Uganda (2005), Zambia (2007), 
South Africa (2003), Senegal (2005), Latvia, Romania 
(2008), Slovakia (2001), Slovenia (2004), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2004), Serbia (2005), Albania,  Poland 
(2005), Macedonia FYR (2003), Montenegro (2007), 
Turkey (2005), Ukraine (2008) 
Education and Training Kenya (2010), Madagascar (2008), Malawi (2007), 
Mozambique (2008), Tanzania (2005), Uganda 
(2005), Zambia (2007), Latvia (2005), Slovakia 
(2001), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), Albania 
(2006), Lithuania (2002), Macedonia FYR (2003), 
Turkey (2005), India (2005). Malaysia (2004), 
Pakistan (2005) 
1. ISAs 200, 315, 330,505, 560, 580, 600, 700, 220, 540, 610, 320, 510,100, 120, 260, 505, 710, 540, 550, 
620, 705. According to the most recent ROSC reports of the countries in this table, the fore-mentioned 
ISAs are not complied with. It is also identified that the form and content of audit reports did not 
comply with relevant ISAs.  
2. These countries do not also have a solid quality assurance in place. There is evidence of non-
compliance with ISQC 1. 
Sources: www worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html. 
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Table 2: Classifying Countries By Basis of ISA Adoption (IAASB pronouncement 2008/9)  in 2012* 
 
Required by 
Law 
National Setter 
adopts ISAs 
ISA adopted with 
Modifications 
‘Others’ 
 
Information 
Inadequate 
Not Adopted 
by 2012 
Committed to 
Adopt after 2012 
(Note 2) 
Bulgaria (De) Canada (D) Albania (De) Jordan (De) Italy (D) Georgia (De) 
Costa Rica (De) Czech Rep Australia (D) Colombia(E) 
Ivory Coast 
(De) 
Dominican Rep 
(De) 
Cyprus(De) Guatemala 
Denmark (D) El Salvador 
(De) 
Japan (D) 
Egypt (E) 
Estonia(De) Botswana (De) 
France (note 1) 
(D) 
Indonesia  ( E) Ecuador (De) 
Nepal (De) 
Hungary(E) Jamaica 
Germany (note 1) 
(D) 
Kyrgyzstan 
(De) 
Madagascar 
(De) 
 
Malta(De) Kazakhstan (De) Hong Kong (D) Morocco ( E) Peru ( E)  
Mauritius(De) Kenya (De) India ( E) Nicaragua (De) 
Russian 
Federation (E) 
 
Romania(De) Lesotho (De) Nigeria (De) Sri Lanka (De) 
Uruguay (D 
e) 
 
Slovenia(De) Malawi (De) Norway (D) Turkey( E) 
Venezuela 
(De) 
 
Croatia(De) Panama Philippines UAE (De) 
Netherlands 
(D) 
 
Mongolia(De) 
Serbia (De) Poland ( E)  
United States 
(D) 
 
 
South Africa (E) 
Portugal (note 1) 
(D) 
 Chile ( E ) 
 
 United Kingdom 
(D) 
Singapor (D)   
 
 Zambia (De) Argentina (De)    
 Zimbabwe (De) Bolivia (De)    
 
Bangladesh (De) 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (De) 
  
 
 New Zealand 
(D) 
Cameron (De) 
  
 
 Cambodia (De) Spain (D)    
 Ghana (De) Vietnam (De)    
 Ukraine (De) Belgium(D)    
 Finland (D) Mexico ( E)    
 Malaysia ( E) China ( E)    
 Pakistan (De)     
 Sweden (D)     
 Thailand ( E)     
 Austria (D)     
 Brazil (E)     
 Greece (D)     
 Uganda (De)     
11 29 23 10 12 4 
Note (1) As per the International Accounting Bulletin (24 April 2015), France, Germany and Portugal are EU 
countries yet to adopt international auditing standards (ISA). According to a report by the Federation of European 
Accountants (FEE), in accordance with the EU Audit Directive (which came into force 16 June 2014), the European 
Commission (EC) was granted the power to impose the use of ISAs for all statutory audits across the EU. For France 
and Germany, there is a process of transposition into national standards that has been in place for years. 
Note (2) Georgia: ISA mandatory from January 2013; Dominican Republic will adopt in 2014; Egypt will not adopt 
ISA until 2015; Nepal will not adopt until 2014. For the purpose of the statistical analysis, countries committed to 
adopt after 2012 are considered as non-adopters in 2012. 
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*No data available on 37 countries for some of the independent variables despite accessing different sources. For 
example because some countries do not have a stock exchange we could not obtain data on market capitalisation.  
Likewise data on cultural scores, regulatory enforcement, lenders and borrowers’ rights are not available for all 
countries We therefore focused on a reduced sample of 89 countries.  
 (D) = Developed markets; (De) = Developing markets; E = Emerging markets. (Sources: Dow Jones Index and IMF 
Websites) 
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Table 2.1: Sample Distribution 
 
 
 
All Countries (note 1) 
Countries with available data  
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
Panel D 
 
126 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
77 
 
 
73 
Countries with incomplete data    (37)  
 
-  
Countries not adopted ISAs (note 2)  (12)  
 
 
- 
Countries committed to adopt after 2012 (note 2)  
 
- 
 
 
- 
 (4)  
 
 
Countries with inadequate information (note 3)  
 
 
 
 
 
- (10) 
 
Net sample for analysis (reported in Table 9) 
 
89 
 
77 
 
73 
 
63 
 
Note (1) These countries are gathered from the IFAC website  
Note (2) This information is determined after perusing the SMO Action Plans IFAC reports of each country. 
These reports can be accessed here https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/compliance-
program/compliance-responses. 
Note (3) Information is not adequate to evaluate whether local adoption process, including ISAs translation into 
local language is reasonably up to date with translation lags of a year. In other cases where a country indicates 
that local auditing standards is based on or similar to ISAs, it is not clear whether modifications to or other 
differences from ISAs meet the IAASB modifications policy 
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Table 3: Description of Variables 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Narrative 
Linking Variables 
with Isomorphism 
Sources 
 
Adoption of 
International 
Standards on 
Auditing ) 
ISAADOPT Measures the 
adoption on a 
multi-nomous 
basis.  “4” means 
that ISA is 
mandatory by law, 
“3” national 
standard setters 
have adopted ISA 
as auditing 
standards but not 
mandatory by law, 
“2” ISAs have been 
generally adopted 
as the local auditing 
standards but 
subject to 
modification and 
finally when a 
country is coded as 
“1” it means the 
IFAC does not have 
adequate 
information. 
‘0’ ISA not adopted 
 International Federation of 
Accountants (www.ifac.org) 
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/c
ompliance-assessment/part_3 for 
each country 
Independent 
Variables 
    
Regulatory 
Enforcement 
REGENF Measures of 
regulatory 
enforcement in a 
country and ranges 
from 0 to 1. 0 
implies 
enforcement is low 
and 1 is high. It is 
an average of five 
sub-variablesii. 
Coercive 
World Justice Project, Rule of Law 
Index(worldjusticeproject.org) 
Protection of 
Minority 
Interest 
PMIS Measures 
protection of 
minority 
shareholders’ 
interests on a scale 
of 1 to 7. 1 implies 
not protected and 7 
highly protected 
Coercive World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report (2009-
2012) www.weforum.org 
Political System POLSYS Measure of the 
democracy index 
and ranges on a 
scale of 0-10. Full 
democracy = 8 – 
10, Flawed 
democracy 6 to 7.9. 
Hybrid = 4 to 5.9. 
Normative Economist Intelligence Unit (2009-
2012) www.eiu.com 
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Autocracy = 0 to 
3.9 
Higher 
Education 
HET Measures tertiary 
enrolment score 
and ranges from 1 
to 7. 1 = lowest 
attendance and 7 
highest. 
Normative World Economic Forum (2009-
2012) 
Lenders & 
Borrowers 
Rights 
LBRIGHTS Measures the 
degree of legal 
protection of 
lenders and 
borrowers in a 
country and ranges 
on a scale of 0 to 
10. 0 = no 
protection and 10 
fully protected. 
Coercive World Economic Forum (2009-
2012) 
Foreign Aid FORAID Measures 
proportion of 
foreign aid relative 
to gross domestic 
product. 
Coercive World Bank Indicators (2009-2012) 
Import 
Penetration 
IMPOPEN It is the ratio of 
import value of 
commodities sold 
as a proportion of 
the gross domestic 
product. 
Mimetic World Economic Forum (2009-
2012) 
Prevalence of 
Foreign 
Ownership 
POFO Measures the 
prevalence of 
foreign ownership 
on a scale of 1-7. 1 
= no foreign 
ownership and 7 = 
prevalence of 
foreign ownership. 
 
Mimetic World Economic Forum (2009-
2012) 
Market 
Capitalisation 
MKCAP Measures market 
capitalisation as 
percentage of gross 
domestic product 
(Control Variable) 
 World Bank Indicators (2009-2012) 
data.worldbankorg/indicators 
GDP Growth GDPGR Measures growth 
rate in national 
income (Control 
Variable) 
 World Bank Indicators (2009-2012) 
Judicial 
Independence 
JUDI Measure how 
independent is the 
judiciary of a 
country  
 La Porta et al (2006) The Journal of 
Finance, pp.1-32 
Efficiency of 
Legal 
Framework 
EOLFW Measures the 
efficiency of the 
legal framework 
 La Porta et al (2006) 
Power Distance PWD Measures power 
distance in a 
country 
 Hofstede Cultural Score (1984) 
Culture’s Consequences: 
International Differences  in Work 
Related values, Beverly Hills, CA 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
UNA Measures 
uncertainty 
 Hofstede Cultural score (1984) 
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avoidance 
Political System POLYS Measurement of 
Democracy Index 
 Economic Intelligence Unit, 
Democratic Index report 2012.  
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 Table 4 Descriptive Statistics (N=356)  
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
N 
ISAADOP 1.944 2.091 4.000 1.000 0.916 356 
REGENF 0.479 0.701 0.891 0.310 0.152 356 
PMIS 4.401 4.756 6.000 2.800 .753 356 
POLSYS* 6.267 1.855 9.931 2.578 1.795 356 
HET 38.56 26.087 40.367 22.297 1.932 356 
LBRIGHTS 5.722 2.326 10.221 1.000 2.130 356 
FORAID 2.069 3.352 6.443 1.435 0.87 356 
IMPOPEN 41.750 28.934 57.012 22.622 1.106 356 
POFO 4.946 .748 6.223 3.189 0.729 356 
MKCAP* 51.918 29.751 420.900 102.310 56.132 356 
GDPGR* 3.222 3.200 12.300 -7.400 3.394 356 
JUDI 3.950 3.701 6.712 1.590 1.354 356 
EOLFW 3.637 3.600 5.670 1.600 0.948 356 
PWD 59.251 64.000 104.000 11.000 19.216 356 
UNA 67.872 69.000 112.000 13.000 23.079 356 
 
ISA adoption is the dependent variable. 
2 
The dependent variable is recorded in the order of 0, 
1,2,3, and 4. 4= Required by Law or Regulation; 3 = ISA are adopted by national standard setter; 
2 = ISA partially adopted or modified to meet national needs and 1= ISA Inadequate information, 
0=ISA not adopted by 2012. The independent variables are: Regulatory Enforcement (REGENF), 
Protection of Minority Interest (PMIS), Educational Attainment (HET), Lenders and Borrowers’ 
Rights (LBRIGHTS), Foreign Aid (FORAID). Import Penetration (IMPOPEN), Political System 
(POLSYS)* and Prevalence of Foreign Ownership (POFO).  All the independent variables relate 
to the period 2009-2012.  
*Political systems include four types namely: Full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid system 
and autocracy.  
Market Capitalisation as a % of GDP and GDP growth rate are control variables. 
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Table 5: Mean Values of Country Level Variables (Average Score 2009-2012) 
 
Countries  PMIS  REGENF HET
1
 LBRIGHTS IMPOPEN
2
  POFO FORAID
3
   POLYS 
Albania      4.1 0.4 19.2 9.0 52.8 4.5 2.9 5.8 
Argentina       3.6 0.4 66.6 3.8 15.3 5.1 0.0 6.7 
Australia       5.4 0.83 75.5 9.0 21.0 5.7 0.0 9.2 
Austria 5.2 0.84 52.6 6.5 49.3 5.5 0.0 8.6 
Bangladesh 3.6 0.2 7.0 7.3 26.5 4.3 1.2 5.8 
Belgium 5.1 0.3 62.8 6.5 77.3 5.9 0.0 8.1 
Bolivia 3.2 0.4 39.5 1.0 35.3 3.4 3.5 6.0 
Bosnia and Herzgovina 2.9 0.1 33.6 5.5 14.8 4.5 3.0 5.5 
Botswana 4.8 0.2 6.4 7.0 53.5 5.5 1.3 9.7 
Brazil 4.6 0.3 32.9 2.8 21.0 4.8 0.0 7.3 
Bulgaria 3.6 0.5 49.3 2.5 62.3 4.4 0.0 6.9 
Cambodia 3.9 0.1 6.0 6.3 30.8 4.7 6.7 4.9 
Cameron 4.3 0.2 7.7 3.0 29.8 5.2 2.4 3.4 
Canada 5.6 0.8 62.4 6.3 31.0 5.7 0.0 9.1 
Chile 5.0 0.3 50.0 4.0 32.3 6.0 0.1 7.7 
China 4.3 0.2 22.9 3.8 30.0 4.6 0.0 3.0 
Colombia 4.2 0.5 33.8 4.3 18.3 4.7 0.3 6.5 
Costa Rica 4.5 0* 25.3 4.75 41.64 5.75 .21 8.05 
Cote D’ivoire 4.1 0.1 7.8 3.0 26.3 5.4 7.4 3.0 
Croatia 3.7 0.5 46.5 6.0 7.3 4.4 0.1 7.0 
Cyprus 5.2 0* 38.7 7.0 52.43 4.6        0        7.5 
Czech rep 4.1 0.3 55.4 6.0 13.5 5.3 0.0 8.2 
Denmark 5.6 0.85 79.7 8.8 40.3 5.5 0.0 9.5 
Dominican rep 3.9 0.5 33.9 3.3 40.8 5.4 6.2 6.3 
Egypt 4.5 0.1 31.6 2.5 26.8 4.7 0.4 3.9 
El Salvador 4.0 0.5 22.9 4.5 20.5 5.4 1.3 6.4 
Ecuador 3.7 .46 34 2.5 31.05 3.85 .24 5.7 
Estonia 4.7 0.4 64.5 5.8 76.5 5.3 0.0 7.7 
Ethiopia 4.5 0.2 3.2 4.0 30.3 3.6 10.6 4.2 
Finland 5.9 0.2 94.0 6.8 38.5 5.7 0.0 9.2 
France 4.9 0.7 55.3 6.8 28.3 5.7 0.0 7.9 
Georgia 3.5 0.2 33.8 6.0 53.8 4.8 5.6 4.9 
Germany 5.3 0.4 45.4 8.8 19.3 5.4 0.0 8.6 
Ghana 4.9 0.5 5.9 6.8 44.5 5.2 5.2 5.7 
Greece 4.9 0.1 92.2 3.0 31.3 4.8 0.0 8.0 
Guatemala 3.8 0.2 14.7 6.5 34.8 5.3 0.9 6.0 
Hong Kong SAR 5.1 0.4 33.7 8.3 112.8 6.5 0.0 6.1 
Hungary 4.3 0.2 67.6 6.8 80.0 5.9 0.0 7.3 
India 4.8 0.4 12.4 7.5 27.0 4.8 0.2 7.6 
Indonesia 4.7 0.5 18.6 3.5 23.3 5.2 0.1 6.5 
Italy 3.6 0.3 67.4 3.0 26.5 4.2 0.0 7.8 
Jamaica 4.6 0.2 20.7 7.3 50.0 5.3 0.7 7.3 
Japan 5.0 0.8 57.8 6.8 15.3 4.5 0.0 8.1 
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Jordan 5.1 0.5 39.9 4.3 69.3 5.1 3.7 3.8 
Kazakhstan 3.7 0.2 48.4 4.8 30.0 4.2 0.2 3.3 
Kenya 4.2 0.4 3.4 9.5 36.3 5.0 5.0 4.8 
Kyrgyz rep 3.1 0.2 45.8 8.0 89.0 3.8 8.1 4.3 
Lesotho 3.6 0* 3.6 6.5  107.7 4.95 8.5 6.36 
Macedonia, FYR 3.8 0.1 35.2 6.8 65.3 3.9 1.9 6.2 
Madagascar 3.7 0.1 3.1 1.8 48.0 4.3 4.8 4.8 
Malawi 4.7 0.1 0.2 7.5 46.5 4.9 19.5 5.5 
Malaysia 5.2 0.3 30.3 9.5 72.3 5.1 0.0 6.2 
Malta 5.3 0* 31.1 2.0 84.2 5.1 0* 8.33 
Mauritius 5.3 0* 20.7 5.0  63.8 5.0 1.6 8.07 
Mexico 4.3 0.3 26.7 4.0 32.8 5.7 0.0 6.8 
Mongolia 3.0 0.1 48.2 5.8 62.8 5.0 5.2 6.5 
Morocco 4.5 0.5 11.8 3.0 44.8 4.7 1.3 3.9 
Nepal 3.7 0.1 7.5 5.0 36.0 3.2 5.1 4.0 
Netherlands 5.3 0.8 60.2 6.3 69.0 5.6 0.0 4.0 
New Zealand 5.7 0.4 79.3 9.3 27.3 5.9 0.0 9.2 
Nicaragua 3.6 0.1 18.1 3.0 64.8 4.6 7.5 5.8 
Nigeria 4.1 0.5 10.2 7.8 20.0 4.9 0.6 3.6 
Norway 5.8 0.4 75.6 6.8 27.8 5.5 0.0 9.7 
Pakistan 4.2 0.4 4.9 5.5 19.8 4.4 1.4 4.4 
Panama 4.5 0.1 45.1 6.0 51.3 5.8 0.3 7.2 
Peru 4.5 0.5 34.9 6.3 22.8 5.7 0.2 6.3 
Philippines 4.3 0.5 28.6 3.0 33.5 4.5 0.1 6.3 
Poland 4.4 0.6 66.5 7.5 42.5 4.9 0.0 7.2 
Portugal 4.7 0.1 55.8 3.3 37.5 4.8 0.0 8.0 
Romania 4.1 0.3 58.7 7.8 38.0 4.7 0.0 6.8 
Russian federation 3.2 0.2 74.7 3.0 21.5 3.6 0.0 4.4 
Serbia 3.0 0.1 40.5 7.3 50.0 4.2 2.3 6.4 
Singapore 5.6 0.7 58.6 9.8 181.5 6.4 0.0 5.9 
Slovenia 3.7 0.1 85.1 5.8 76.8 4.1 0.0 7.9 
South Africa 5.6 0.6 15.4 8.0 29.8 5.3 0.3 7.9 
Spain 4.4 0.7 69.0 6.0 27.8 5.3 0.0 8.2 
Sri Lanka 4.8 0.1 15.1 3.8 14.8 4.9 1.1 6.4 
Sweden 6.0 0.9 75.1 5.3 41.5 6.2 0.0 9.7 
Thailand 4.7 0.5 46.3 4.3 63.8 4.8 0.0 6.4 
Turkey 4.0 0.5 36.4 3.8 28.5 4.9 0.3 5.7 
UAE 5.0 0.3 23.8 3.8 71.0 5.1 0.0 2.5 
Uganda 4.1 0.2 3.6 6.0 33.0 5.7 8.5 5.1 
UK 5.3 0.4 58.6 9.3 31.8 6.1 0.0 8.2 
Ukraine 3.0 0.2 76.2 8.8 52.3 3.7 0.5 6.5 
Uruguay 4.4 0.2 58.3 5.0 26.8 5.9 0.1 8.1 
US 5.1 0.7 82.1 7.8 15.8 5.3 0.0 8.2 
Venezuela 3.5 0.2 60.9 2.8 26.8 3.7 0.0 5.3 
Vietnam 4.3 0.2 9.5 7.3 81.0 4.2 3.0 2.8 
Zambia 4.4 0.1 2.3 8.3 36.3 5.8 5.5 5.6 
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Zimbabwe 4.7 0.1 3.7 6.7 60.8 3.9 8.4 2.6 
Sources: World Bank Indicators, World Economic Forum, World Justice Project Report, Economic Intelligence Unit 
Democratic Index. HET
1   
tertiary Education Enrolment Rate; IMPOPEN
2 
Import of goods/services as a percentage of 
GDP; FORAID
3
  Foreign aid as a percentage GDP
 
0* no data was available and they are considered ‘0’ for the purpose of the statistical analysis. 
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Table 6 Regression Results using ISA adoption as a Dependent Variable  
Panel A: (89 countries including all categories over 4 years) 
Model 1 Linear Regression Model 2 Multinomial 
Regression
a
 
Model 3 Binary 
Logistic Regression
b
 
 Isomorphis
m 
Coefficien
t 
t-value Wald Exp(B) Sig Wal
d 
Exp 
(B) 
Sig 
Intercept   -.567 .140 - .708 1.330 .299 .249 
REGENF Coercive 
(H2) 
.173 2.638**
* 
2.531 3.017 .046** 2.329 .618 .224 
PMIS Coercive 
(H1) 
.203 3.177**
* 
2.964 3.934 .036** .664 .830 .415 
POLYS Normative 
(H8) 
.263 3.716**
* 
16.54
0 
.219 .003**
* 
5.800 2.746 .016*
* 
HET Normative 
(H7) 
.136 2.011** 2.281 1.992 .046** 1.280 1.997 .059* 
LBRIGHT
S 
Coercive 
(H3) 
.387 7.453**
* 
3.627 1.737 .013** 4.580 1.135 .032*
* 
FORAID Coercive 
(H4) 
.263 3.821**
* 
2.360 1.725 .041** 1.291 .657 .09* 
IMPOPEN Mimetic (H6) .049 .940 5.074 1.675 .024** 2.722 1.118 .014*
* 
POFO Mimetic (H5) .281 4.673**
* 
2.098 .529 .029** 3.102 1.481 .078* 
GDP 
Growth 
 .042 .731 .890 .490 .109 1.008 .681 .131 
MKCAP  .057 .921 1.766 1.47 .031** 1.821 1.42 .041*
* 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
  .215  .515   .145  
F-Value*   12.248  236.44
3 
  37.95
6 
 
N   356  356   356  
          
Notes: p***<.01; p **<.05; p*<.10.  ISA adoption is the dependent variable. 
2 
The dependent variable is 
recorded in the order 
Of 0, 1,2,3,and 4.  4= Required  by Law or Regulation; 3 = ISA are adopted by national standard setter; 2 = ISA 
partially adopted or 
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 modified to meet national needs, 1 = “others”  i.e. no adequate information is available and ‘0’ not adopted. F 
test for linear regression model and Likelihood ratios for the multinomial and binary regression models.  The 
independent variables are: Regulatory Enforcement (REGENF), Protection of Minority Interest (PMIS), Higher 
Education enrolment score (HET), Lenders and Borrowers’ Rights (LBRIGHTS), Foreign Aid (FORAID). 
Import Penetration (IMPOPEN)  and Prevalence of Foreign Ownership (POFO). GDP Growth sourced from 
World Bank Indicators, MKCAP-Market Capitalisation also sourced from World Bank Indicators (2009-2012).  
Political system (POLYS) is sourced from EIU Democratic Index report (2008-2012). For the multinomial 
regression and binary logistic regression, the Pseudo R square is the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-squared 
measurement. 
 
Page 53 of 60 International Journal of Auditing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Table 7 Fixed Effect Regression Results using ISA adoption as Dependent Variable  
Panel A: (89 countries including all categories over 4 years)  
Model 1 Pooled Linear Regression Model 4 Year Fixed 
effects 
Model 5 Country 
Fixed effects 
 Isomorphism Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  - -.567 - 1.863 - .888 
REGENF Coercive 
(H2) 
.173 2.638*** .141 2.265** .140 .938 
PMIS Coercive 
(H1) 
.203 3.177*** .203 3.171** .012 .161 
POLYS Normative .263 3.716*** .258 3.646*** ..327 4.746** 
HET Normative 
(H7) 
.136 2.011** .136 2.001** .030 .402 
LBRIGHTS Coercive 
(H3) 
.387 7.453*** .391 .7.322*** .416 8.240*** 
FORAID Coercive 
(H4) 
.263 3.821*** .161 1.863** .043 .719 
IMPOPEN Mimetic (H6) .049 .940 .047 .895 .032 .644 
POFO Mimetic (H5) .281 4.673*** .183 1784** .097 1.175 
GDP 
Growth 
 .042 .731 .051 .785 .92 .604 
MKCAP  .057 .921 .79 .803 .78 .912 
Adjusted R
2
   .215  .212  .278 
F-Value*   12.248  9.654  14.577 
N   356  356  356 
This table represents the results of the following of the following regressions: 
Model 4:  ISAADOP it= β0 + β1 REGENF it + β2 PMIS it + β3   FORAID it + β4 POLSYS it + β5 HET it +  β6  
LBRIGHTS it + β7 IMPOPEN it +  β8 POFO it +  β9   GDPGrowth it + β10   MKCAP it + Year Fixed Effects 
Model 5: ISAADOPT it = β0 + β1 REGENF it + β2 PMIS it + β3 FORAID it + β4 POLSYS it + β5 HETit +  β6 
LBRIGHTS it + β7 IMPOPEN it +  β8 POFO it +  β9 GDPGrowth it + β10   MKCAP it + Country Fixed Effects 
The panel regression s are estimated using (i) pooled regression with no effects, (ii) YEAR fixed effects and (iii) 
COUNTRY fixed effects.***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 8 Regression Results (Sensitivity Analysis using ISA adoption as Dependent Variable and 
Separate Democracy Grouping 
Panel A: (89 countries including all categories over 4 years)  
    
Model 1 Pooled Linear Regression Model 6 Full 
Democracy 
Model 7 Flawed 
Democracy 
Model 8 Hybrid  Model 9 Autocracy 
 Isomorphism Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  - -.567 - .098 - 1.736 - 2.504 - 2.323 
REGENF Coercive 
(H2) 
.173 2.638*** .176 2.932** .173 2.638** .173 2.638** .173 2.638** 
PMIS Coercive 
(H1) 
.203 3.177*** .163 2.305** .135 2.012** .194 2.959** .163 2.464** 
POLYS Normative .263 3.716*** .134 2.486** .114 2.212** .081 1.475 -.050 -.921 
HET Normative 
(H7) 
.136 2.011** .138 2.151** .136 2.011** .136 2.011** .136 2.011** 
LBRIGHTS Coercive 
(H3) 
.387 7.453*** .441 8.379*** .437 8.580*** .442 8.611*** .422 7.956*** 
FORAID Coercive 
(H4) 
.263 3.821*** .203 3.126*** .251 3.713*** .251 3.713*** .251 3.713*** 
IMPOPEN Mimetic (H6) .049 .940 .046 .456 .046 .940 .046 .940 .010 .200 
POFO Mimetic (H5) .281 4.673*** .145 2.234** .163 1.917** .138 2.137** .130 1.951** 
GDP 
Growth 
 .042 .731 .42. .731 .42 .731 .42 .731 .42 .731 
MKCAP  .057 .921 .057 .921 .057 .921 .057 .921 .057 .921 
Adjusted R
2
   .215  .184  .195  .189  .186 
F-Value*   12.248  10.943  11.074  11.278  11.070 
N   356  356  356  356  356 
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This table represents the results of the following of the following regressions: 
Model 6: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 FD + β5 HET +  β6 LBRIGHTS + β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   MKCAP +  e 
Model 7: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 FLD + β5 HET +  β6 LBRIGHTS + β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   MKCAP + e 
Model 8: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 HBS + β5 HET +  β6 LBRIGHTS + β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   MKCAP + e 
MOdel 9: ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 AC + β5 HET+  β6 LBRIGHTS + β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   MKCAP + e 
The panel regressions are estimated using (i) pooled regression with (i) full democracy, (ii) flawed democracy and (iii) hybrid system and (iv) autocracy as measured and 
classified by the Economic Intelligence Unit.***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 9 Regression Results Sensitivity Analysis using ISA adoption as Dependent Panel A -D 
Model 1 Pooled Linear Regression Model 10 (Panel B)
 1
 Model 11 (Panel C)
 2
 Model 12 (Panel D)
 3
  
 Isomorphism Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept  - -.567 - 3.252  4.400  6.086 
REGENF Coercive 
(H2) 
.173 2.638*** .118 2.731** .117 2.118** .137 2.987** 
PMIS Coercive 
(H1) 
.203 3.177*** .239 3.617*** .198 2.829** .291 3.736** 
POLYS Normative .263 3.716*** .241 3.059** .236 2.882 .253 2.715** 
HET Normative 
(H7) 
.136 2.011** .114 2.069** .135 2.987** .142 2.683** 
LBRIGHTS Coercive 
(H3) 
.387 7.453*** .413 7.611*** .417 7.389*** .373 6.005*** 
FORAID Coercive 
(H4) 
.263 3.821*** .062 1.025 .140 2.891** .161 2.916** 
IMPOPEN Mimetic (H6) .049 .940 .022 .983 .040 1.013 .045 .696 
POFO Mimetic (H5) .281 4.673*** .133 2.781** .136 2.813** .149 2.596** 
GDP 
Growth 
 .042 .731 .051 .674 .059 .681 .079 .812 
MKCAP  .057 .921 .063 .967 .058 .786 .081 1.013 
Adjusted R
2
   .215  .242  .219  .181 
F-Value*   12.248  13.181  11.101  7.879 
N   356  308  292  252 
This table represents the results of the following of the following regressions: 
Models 10-12 : ISAADOPT = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS + β3 FORAID + β4 POLYS + β5 HET+  β6 LBRIGHTS + β7 IMPOPEN +  β8 POFO +  β9 GDPGrowth + β10   
MKCAP + e 
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2
Model 10 Panel B excludes countries that have not adopted ISAs.  
2
Model11 Panel C excludes both countries that have not adopted and committed to adopt after 2012.  
3Model 12 Panel D includes only ISA adopted in law, by standards setters and with modification. 
The panel regressions are estimated using (i) pooled regression with (i) full democracy, (ii) flawed democracy and (iii) hybrid system and (iv) autocracy as measured and 
classified by the Economic Intelligence Unit.***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 10: Model 13 Linear Regression for Adoption of Clarity Standards 
 Isomorphism Coefficient t-value 
Intercept   -.567 
REGENF Coercive (H2) .189 3.723*** 
PMIS Coercive (H1) .197 2.645*** 
POLYS Normative .248 3.237*** 
HET Normative (H7) .748 1.932** 
LBRIGHTS Coercive (H3) .296 5.731*** 
FORAID Coercive (H4) .198 2.998*** 
IMPOPEN Mimetic (H6) .068 .893 
POFO Mimetic (H5) .301 4.784*** 
GDP Growth  .042 .731 
MKCAP  .057 .921 
Adjusted R
2
   .189 
F-Value*   13.182 
N   288 
Only 72 countries adopted ISA clarity standards. *** Significant at .001 level, ** significant at .05 level. 
The regression is run using the following equation: 
(/(1 − ) = β0 + β1 REGENF + β2 PMIS  + β3 FORAID + β4 HET + β5 LBRIGHTS + β6 IMPOPEN +  
β7 POFO + β8 GDPGrowth + β9  MKCAP + ε 
Pi is the probability of adopting the Clarity ISAs. It is equal to Log (pi/1-pi) where pi = probability of a country 
adopting ISAs and 1-pi = 1 – probability of a country not adopting ISAs. 
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Table 11 Linear Regression Sensitivity Analysis (With Hofstede Cultural Score and La Porta Legal 
Variables)  
Model 14 (Including 2 Variables from La Porta) Model 15 (Including 2 
cultural scores) 
Model 16 (La Porta & 
Culture) 
Variables Isomorphis
m 
Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value Coefficien
t 
t-value 
Intercept   -.208  -.227  -.193 
REGENF Coercive .191 1.347* .351 2.673** .251 1.123* 
PMIS Coercive .263 2.115** .167 1.832* .124 1.673* 
HET Normative .217 1.578* .123 1.044* .087 .411 
POLYS Normative .238 2.428** .197 1.876* .183 1.673* 
LBRIGHTS Coercive .468 3.980*** .459 4.167*** .398 3.392*** 
FORAID Coercive .098 .973 .108 1.134 .103 1.004 
IMPOPEN Mimetic -.235 -.984 .197 .546 -.042 -.701 
POFO Mimetic .163 2.009** .127 2.481** .254 1.753* 
GDP 
Growth 
 -.008 .060 .081 .596 -.054 -.383 
MKCAP  .034 .233 -.015 -.100 .004 .028 
JUDI  .091 .507   .228 .768 
EOLFW  .193 .486   -.207 -.773 
PWD    .126 .872 .191 1.082 
UAV    -.001 -.007 -.022 -.167 
Adjusted R
2
   .213  .236  .201 
F-Value*   13.651  14.669  12.205 
N   288  288  288 
        
Notes: p***<.01; p **<.05; p*<.10.  ISA adoption is the dependent variable. 
2 
The dependent variable is 
recorded in the order of 0, 1,2,3,and 4.  
4 = Required by Law or Regulation; 3 = ISA are adopted by national standard setter; 2 = ISA partially adopted 
or modified to meet national needs and 1 = “others”, ‘0’ not adopted. The independent variables are: Regulatory 
Enforcement (REGENF), Protection of Minority Interest (PMIS), Educational Attainment (HET), Lenders and 
Borrowers’ Rights (LBRIGHTS), Foreign Aid (FORAID). Import Penetration (IMPOPEN) and Prevalence of 
Foreign Ownership, JUDI (Judicial Independence), EOLFW (Efficiency of Legal Framework), PWD (Power 
Distance) UAV (uncertainty Avoidance) Political System (POLYS) 
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